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FOREWORD: THE DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION: STATE
FISCAL LIMITS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Richard Briffault*
I. INTRODUCTION
The dominant theme in the resurgent state constitutional jurisprudence
of the last quarter-century has been the effort of many scholars and jurists to
find in state constitutions a progressive alternative to the conservative turn
federal constitutional doctrine has taken in the Burger and Rehnquist eras.
Following the tone set by Justice William Brennan's path-breaking 1977
article in the Harvard Law Review,1 the state constitutional law literature
has sought a more expansive protection of civil liberties through state
constitutional provisions dealing with criminal law and procedure,2 freedom
of expression, 3 and equality, 4 and to ground positive rights to public services
in state constitutional measures dealing with such affirmative governmental
duties as education, 5 welfare,6 and housing.
7
* Vice-Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law
School; B.A. Columbia University, 1974; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1977. Earlier versions of
this Article were presented as the 2003 State Constitutional Law Lecture at Rutgers School of
Law--Camden and at a Columbia faculty lunch workshop. I have benefitted from audience
comments on both occasions, as well as from comments by Clayton Gillette, Laurie Reynolds,
and Stewark Sterk.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 535 (1986).
2. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence
of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141 (1985); Robert M. Pitler, Independent
State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for
Principled Decision-Making, 62 BRooK. L. REv. 1 (1996); Note, Developments in the Law -
The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1367-98 (1982)
[hereinafter Developments].
3. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 2, at 1398-1429.
4. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63
TEx. L. REv. 1195 (1985).
5. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1444-59; Michael Heise, State Constitutions,
School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave:" From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L.
REv. 1151 (1995); Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State
Constitutional Law, 65 TEM. L. REv. 1325 (1992); Molly McUsic, The Use of Education
Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARv. J. LEGis. 307 (1991); William E.
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With much of the analysis of state constitutional law focused on the
failings of federal constitutional law,8 far less attention has been paid to a
distinctive feature of state constitutions that has little to do with civil
liberties or positive rights - the many provisions that seek to protect
taxpayers by limiting the activities and costs of government. The Federal
Constitution says next to nothing about public finance, and when it does so,
it either provides authority for congressional action9 or sets procedures for
raising and spending money.10 It places just a handful of substantive
constraints on federal taxation11 and no restrictions on federal borrowing at
all. By contrast, state constitutions accord extensive consideration to state
and local spending, borrowing, and taxing. State constitutions limit the
purposes for which states and localities can spend or lend their funds, and
expressly address specific spending techniques. 12 These "public purpose"
Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79
EDUC. L. REP. 19 (1993); Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of
Educational Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827 (1998).
6. See Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799 (2002); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1131 (1999)
[hereinafter Hershkoff, Positive Rights]; Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State
Constitutions, 67 FORD. L. REv. 1043 (1999); Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions
and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Norma Rotunno, Note, State Constitutional Social Welfare Provisions and
the Right to Housing, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 111 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism,
106 HARv. L. REv. 1147, 1153 (1993) (citing "the [c]hanged [c]haracter of the [flederal
[b]ench" as a critical reason for the turn to state constitutional law). The focus on federal
constitutional law is equally true of state constitutionalism's leading critic. See James A.
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761, 780-98
(1992) (examples of state courts' limited use of state constitutions all involve due process,
criminal procedure, or freedom of expression).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to "lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises"); id. § 8, cl. 2 (authorizing Congress "[t]o borrow Money on the
credit of the United States"); id. amend. XVI (authorizing imposition of the income tax).
10. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. I (providing that "[a]ll bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives"); id. § 9, cl. 7 (providing that "[n]o Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law").
11. id. § 8, cl. 1 (providing that "[a]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States"); id. § 9, cl. 4 (providing that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct,
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to
be taken"); id. § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.").
12. See, e.g., Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public
Purpose Doctrine, 12 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 143, 143 n. 1 (1993) (finding that forty-six
out of fifty state constitutions contain some limits on spending).
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provisions narrow the range of government action and limit public sector
support for private sector activities. Nearly all state constitutions impose
significant substantive or procedural restrictions on state and local
borrowing. 13 A considerable number also limit state and local taxation.
14
These provisions may be said to constitutionalize a norm of taxpayer
protection.
Fiscal limits, as well as positive rights, thus characterize state
constitutional law. Indeed, the states' fiscal constitutional provisions may
offset the more widely heralded positive rights provisions. By giving priority
to taxpayers over service recipients, these provisions can make it more
difficult for states and localities to raise funds to finance public services.
But the real significance of fiscal limits in understanding state
constitutional law is neither the barriers they create for the financing of
public programs called for by positive rights advocates, nor the challenge
they pose to the progressive image of state constitutional law that has
dominated contemporary scholarly writing in the field. Rather, the most
important lesson they provide grows out of the uncertain effect these
provisions have had in actually controlling state and local finances. There is
an enormous gap between the written provisions of state constitutions and
actual practice. State legislatures and local governments have repeatedly
sought to expand the scope of "public purpose" and to slip the restraints of
the tax and debt limits. 15 Increasingly, these efforts have won the approval
of state courts.
Judicial interpretations have effectively nullified the public purpose
requirements that ostensibly prevent state and local spending, lending, and
borrowing in aid of private endeavors. Supreme court decisions in many
states have also held that a host of financial instruments are beyond the
scope of the constitutional debt limitations. As a result, although debt limits
have altered the forms of state and local borrowing, they probably have had
only a modest effect on aggregate state and local debt. The constitutional
constraints on state and local taxation have been more effective, but their
13. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative
Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REv.
1301, 1315-16 (finding that more than three-quarters of the states have debt limitations in
their constitutions).
14. See, e.g., U.S. ADvIsORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
SIGNIcANT FEATURES OF FIscAL FEDERAISM 18 (1992) (noting that all but seven states place
some restrictions on local property taxation).
15. See infra Parts II-IV.
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impact has been cushioned by judicial determinations that certain revenue-
raising devices are not taxes subject to constitutional limitation.
This Article examines these fiscal limits and their significance for state
constitutional law. I refer to these limits as the "disfavored constitution" for
two reasons. First, they have been disfavored by state constitutional law
scholars, who have largely ignored the state fiscal constitution in favor of
other state constitutional provisions. Second, to a considerable degree, they
have been disfavored by state courts, who frequently read the fiscal
provisions narrowly, technically, and formalistically - often more like bond
indentures than statements of important constitutional norms. 1 6
Parts II, 1H, and IV of this Article will sketch out the principal
provisions that form the states' fiscal constitution, and examine their
contemporary judicial interpretation. In Part V, I will consider why these
provisions have often been read so unsympathetically. In Part VI, I will
briefly assess whether state constitutions ought to be used to constrain state
and local finances. Finally, I will conclude in Part VII by considering the
implications of the judicial treatment of state fiscal limits for the study of
state constitutional law.
II. PUBLIC PURPOSE REQUIREMENTS: THEIR RISE AND FALL
By one recent count, forty-six state constitutions contain provisions,
known collectively as "public purpose" requirements, that expressly limit
the authority of their state and/or local governments to provide financial
assistance to private enterprises. 17 The New York Constitution is typical in
providing that "[tihe money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in
16. The few state constitutional law scholars who have referred to the fiscal limits have
tended to treat them dismissively, too. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, An Approach to State
Constitutional Interpretation, 24 RuTGERS L.J. 985, 985 (1993) (referring to the difficulty of
developing a state constitutional jurisprudence "on a textual foundation that... obsesses in
excruciating detail over pecuniary matters").
17. See Rubin, supra note 12, at 143 n.1. The remaining states appear to rely on judicial
doctrines that similarly require that state or local taxpayer funds be spent only for public
purposes. See Ullrich v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Thomas County, 676 P.2d 127, 132-33
(Kan. 1984) (noting that expenditure of public money must be for a public purpose); Common
Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 15-16 (Me. 1983) (public purpose doctrine implicit in the Maine
Constitution); Clem v. City of Yankton, 160 N.W.2d 125, 130-31 (S.D. 1968) (applying
public purpose doctrine not based on specific state constitutional provision); State ex rel.
Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 205 N.W.2d 784, 793 (Wis. 1973) ("No specific clause in




aid of any private corporation or association, or private undertaking" 18 and
that no "county, city, town, village or school district shall give or loan any
money or property or in aid of any individual, or public or private
corporation or association or private undertaking." 19  Many state
constitutions supplement this general public purpose requirement with
further restrictions on specific forms of assistance.20
These public purpose limitations date back to the mid-nineteenth
century, and reflect the disastrous consequences of the states' extensive
investments in and assistance to private firms in the 1820s and 1830s. The
enormous success of the Erie Canal, which opened in 1825, in energizing
New York's economy inspired a massive program of state governmental
support for turnpikes, canals, and railroads over the next two decades. Many
of these projects blurred public and private lines, with states investing in
private firms, or providing grants, loans and loan guarantees to private
companies. The states frequently obtained the funds they used to aid private
firms by borrowing. Fueled by the intense interstate competition for
economic development, this era of state-supported infrastructure finance was
marked by waste, overbuilding, and mismanagement. The Panic of 1837 led
to a contraction in economic activity, and eventually to an economic crisis.
Many firms that had borrowed from the states were unable to repay their
loans, and many infrastructure projects failed to generate projected revenues.
The states had great difficulties meeting their obligations to their creditors;
nine defaulted on interest payments and four states - Arkansas, Florida,
Michigan, and Minnesota - repudiated all or part of their debts.21
In reaction, the states engaged in a wave of constitutional revision.
22
State constitutions were amended to require that state spending or lending be
18. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8.
19. Id. art. VI, § I.-
20. These may include a prohibition on the state or local government giving or lending
its credit to private firms, or a ban on the state or local government becoming a shareholder in
a public or private corporation. See CoLO. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8;
id. art. VIII, § 1. In addition, public purpose requirements typically apply to state and local
borrowing, so that debts may be incurred only to support public purpose projects. ROBERT S.
AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GniL.TrE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE
84(1992).
21. See B.U. RATCmuRD, AMERIcAN STATE DEBTS 105-14 (1941); ALBERTA M.
SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, U.S. FEDERALISM, AND ECONOMIC
DEvELOPMENT 19-43 (1996).
22. See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONsTTrUTIONs 111-12 (1998);
see also Dale A. Oesterle, Lessons on the Limits of Constitutional Language from Colorado:
The Erosion of the Constitution's Ban on Business Subsidies, 73 U. CoLO. L. REv. 587, 589,
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for a public purpose; to bar the gift or loan of state credit except for a public
purpose; and to ban direct state investment in business corporation
obligations. Initially, these provisions applied only to the activities of state
governments. As a result, they were sometimes circumvented by state
legislation authorizing local governments to provide assistance to private
firms. Another round of waste, overbuilding, and economic crisis resulted,
and in the late nineteenth century, many states amended their constitutions to
apply the public purpose and aid limitations to local governments. 23
The public purpose requirement was never a complete bar to government
financial assistance to the private sector. In the leading mid-nineteenth
century case of Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia,24 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that aid to a privately owned railroad could serve a
public purpose. "The public has an interest in such a road," even if privately
owned, because a railroad provides "comfort, convenience, increase of trade,
opening of markets, and other means of rewarding labor and promoting
wealth."'25 Railroads aside, most nineteenth century courts, however, treated
their state's public purpose requirements as significant barriers to programs
that would provide state or local assistance to private firms or individuals.
Public purpose requirements constitutionalized the public/private divide
with the goal of protecting the public fisc, and thus, the taxpayers, from
private demands. During its heyday, the public purpose requirement
operated to constrain the scope of state and local government, resulting in
the invalidation of a host of economic development and social welfare
programs that state courts found benefitted private, not public, interests. 26
Starting in the 1930s, state courts, faced with an array of state efforts to
counteract the economic effects of the Great Depression, began to widen the
definition of public purpose. In 1938, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld
a state program of issuing bonds to finance the construction of factories and
the acquisition of machinery and equipment for long-term lease to private
firms willing to relocate to the state; such an industrial development program
594 & n.38 (2002) (noting that several Colorado cities had become insolvent due to their
assistance to railroads, thereby contributing to the inclusion in the Colorado Constitution of
1876 of a ban on state and municipal aid to businesses).
23. TARR, supra note 22, at 114.
24. 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
25. Id. at 169.
26. See Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1872) (invalidating government aid to
factories); In re Opinion of the Justices, 195 N.E. 897 (Mass. 1935) (holding use of tax
revenues to insure banks against loss on home mortgages not within "public purpose"
limitations); Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873) (holding financial assistance to
private residential housing development violated public purpose requirement).
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was held to serve a public purpose.27 Over time, as state industrial and
economic development initiatives spread, courts came to broaden the notion
of public purpose to include increased employment and tax base growth, and
to approve programs that provided assistance to individual firms. Initially,
many of these programs were funded by revenue bonds,28 that is, bonds
backed solely by the new revenues to be generated by the firms receiving
assistance, so that courts could find that taxpayer dollars were not at risk.29
Other courts did not distinguish between programs financed by revenue
bonds and programs backed by general treasury funds. 30 Some courts
resisted the trend and continued to invalidate public financial assistance to
private businesses.3 1 In some states where courts were reluctant to permit
direct state assistance to private firms, the state constitutions were amended
to permit some forms of industrial development assistance.
During the closing decades of the twentieth century, state courts
increasingly expanded the scope of permissible public purposes, so that by
the end of the century virtually every state supreme court had upheld at least
some economic development programs that involved direct assistance -
including cash grants, low-interest loans, and tax breaks - to individual
firms.32 Landmark decisions include Common Cause v. State,33 in which the
Maine Supreme Court upheld the state's plan to commit $15 million in
taxpayer funds to improve the facilities of the Bath Iron Works in order to
persuade the company to remain in the state, and Hayes v. State Property &
Buildings Commission,34 in which a closely divided Kentucky Supreme
Court upheld a package of inducements - with direct costs estimated at
between $125 and $268 million - to persuade the Toyota Motor Corporation
to open a plant in the state. Some courts have continued to police economic
27. See Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799, 804 (Miss. 1938).
28. For an explanation of the difference between revenue bonds and general obligation
bonds, see infra pp. 918-19.
29. See, e.g., Basehore v. Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 248 A.2d 212, 223-24 (Pa.
1968).
30. See, e.g., State ex rel Beck v. City of York, 82 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1957).
31. See Viii. of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 353 P.2d 767 (Idaho 1960);
Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 159 S.E.2d 745 (N.C. 1968); State ex rel. McLeod v.
Riley, 278 S.E.2d 612 (S.C. 1981).
32. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 627 n.1 (N.C. 1996)
(noting that "courts in forty-six states in addition to North Carolina have upheld the
constitutionality of governmental expenditures and related assistance for economic
development incentives").
33. 455 A.2d 1 (Me. 1983).
34. 731 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1987).
20031
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development programs, invalidating some - such as those aimed at aiding
non-industrial activities like hotels and restaurants. 35 More generally, courts
have taken a posture of extreme deference to state legislatures, finding that a
broad range of goals fall under the rubric of public purpose, and that
legislative determinations that a spending, loan, or tax incentive program
will promote the public purpose are to be accepted as long as they are
"not... irrational."' 36 Even if much of the benefit of an economic
development program consists of profits to private firms or individuals, the
program may still serve the public purpose of attracting business or
promoting growth. 37 Even if the public benefits of aid to the private sector
are acknowledged to be "speculative," while the private benefits are more
immediate, courts are still likely to find that the measure satisfies the
constitutional public purpose requirement. 38 Such a program will be rejected
by the courts "only if it is 'clear and palpable' that there can be no benefit to
the public."'39 As one dissenting North Carolina justice observed, lamenting
the state supreme court's 1996 decision to uphold an economic development
program which would permit public funds to be used, inter alia, to pay for
spousal relocation assistance when private firms move to the state, 4° under
the court's decision a state or locality could use public funds to pay for
country club memberships for corporate executives if that would entice
firms to relocate to the state.4 1
Today, state constitutional "public purpose" requirements are largely
rhetorical. State legislatures define what public purposes are and receive
great deference when they determine that a particular program promotes the
public purpose. State constitutional provisions articulate the truism that
35. See Purvis v. City of Little Rock, 667 S.W.2d 936 (Ark. 1984) (finding no public
purpose in financing private hotel); Holding's Little America v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 712
P.2d 331 (Wyo. 1985) (finding no public purpose in providing aid to hotel and restaurant).
But see Hucks v. Riley, 357 S.E.2d 458 (S.C. 1987) (finding public interest in tourism
development provides public purpose justifying use of state funds to finance privately owned
and operated lodging and restaurant facilities).
36. Delogu v. State, 720 A.2d 1153, 1155 (Me. 1998).
37. See Ward v. Commonwealth, 685 A.2d 1061 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); WDW
Props., Inc. v. City of Sumter, 535 S.E.2d 631, 636 (S.C. 2000); King County v. Taxpayers of
King County, 949 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Wash. 1997); Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 546
N.W.2d 424,434 (Wis. 1996).
38. See WDW Props., Inc., 535 S.E.2d at 635-36.
39. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 628 (Wis. 1998).
40. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 633 (N.C. 1996) (Orr, J.,
dissenting).
41. Id. at 636 (Orr, J., dissenting).
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public spending must be for a public purpose. But they do not provide a
judicially enforceable constraint on state or local government. 42
III. DEBT LIMITATIONS: FROM RESTRICTION TO EVASION
A. Substantive and Procedural Restrictions on Borrowing
The vast majority of state constitutions impose some limitation on the
ability of their state and local governments to incur debt.43 These
constitutional limitations take a variety of forms. Some bar state debt
42. The decline of the public purpose doctrine as a limit on state spending has had some
impact on other state constitutional restrictions on public aid to the private sector. In some
states, the restriction on lending of credit does not apply if the assistance is provided for a
public purpose. See AlASKA CONST. art IX, § 6; ILL CONST. art. VIII, § 1. In those states, the
expansion of public purposes simultaneously erodes the ban on lending of credit. See also
Brower v. State, 969 P.2d 42, 53 (Wash. 1998) (lending of credit restriction does not apply if
loan advances a "fundamental purpose" of government).
In other states, however, lending of credit remains an additional restriction. Even if a
program constitutes a public purpose, the technique of lending the state or local government's
credit may still be proscribed. Most state courts find that a lending of credit has occurred
when a state serves as a surety or guarantees a loan made by another lender. See, e.g.,
Barnhart v. City of Fayetteville, 900 S.W.2d 539 (Ark. 1995). The constitutional provision,
thus, protects against the tendency of legislators to discount the risks posed by standing as
surety when the state is not required to directly commit any funds at the time the suretyship
obligation is assumed. A few state courts have gone further and found that a proscribed
lending of credit occurs when a state borrows money and provides the proceeds to another
entity. See, e.g., Wash. Higher Educ. Facilities v. Gardner, 699 P.2d 1240 (Wash. 1985). For
the most part, however, state courts have distinguished lending of credit from borrowing
followed by the provision of public funds to a private recipient, and have limited the lending
of credit ban to the former situation. See, e.g., State v. Inland Prot. Fin. Corp., 699 So. 2d
1352 (Fla. 1997).
One nineteenth-century restriction that may have survived the twentieth-century
expansion of public purpose is the prohibition on state investment in business corporations.
This provision, in the constitution of a number of states, appears to be a direct response to the
nineteenth century practice of state subscriptions to canal or railroad company stock. See
David E. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An
Historic and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 265, 278-79 (1963). Two state supreme
courts have indicated that this ban may apply even if the investment is for an economic
development purpose. See Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986); W.
Va. Trust Fund, Inc. v. Bailey, 485 S.E.2d 407 (W. Va. 1997). One arguably paradoxical
result is that a state may be able to give or lend money to a private firm on a public purpose
theory, but may be barred from taking an equity position in the firm, which would enable it to
share in any appreciation in the firm's value.
43. See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 13, at 1315.
20031
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outright.44 Others impose very low limits on the amount of debt a state may
incur.45 Some cap state or local debt or debt service at a specified fraction of
state or local taxable wealth or revenues. 46 Tying the debt limit to a fraction
of property wealth or revenue is a particularly widespread way of limiting
local government debt.47 This approach suggests an attempt to limit debt to
the "carrying capacity" of the state or locality, so that new borrowing does
not result in burdensome taxation or cuts in existing services.
Most commonly, state constitutions rely on a procedural restriction:
Debt may not be incurred without the approval of a supermajority in the
legislature, of voters in a referendum, or both.48 This legislative
supermajority or voter approval requirement may stand on its own or may be
combined with a substantive cap on the amount of state or local debt.49 For
the states, the procedural requirements are often the real restrictions on debt.
44. See IND. CONST. art. X, § 5 (prohibiting state debt except "to meet casual deficits in
revenue," repel invasion, suppress insurrection or provide for state defense); accord W. VA.
CONST. art. X, § 4.
45. See ARIz. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (limiting total state debt to $350,000); OHiO CONST.
art. VIII, § 1 (providing state debt limit of $750,000); KY. CONST. § 49 (state debt limited to
$500,000); R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (limiting total state debt to $50,000).
46. See GA. CONST. art. VII, § IV, 1 II (limiting debt service on state debt to 10% of
state revenue); HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 13 (providing that debt service on state debt is limited
to 18.5% of the average state general fund revenues in the three prior fiscal years; local
government debts limited to 15% of total assessed value of real property in each political
subdivision); NEv. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (limiting aggregate state debt to 2% of assessed
valuation of property in state); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (limiting debt service on aggregate
state debt to 9% of average of state revenues over the three prior fiscal years).
47. See IND. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (capping municipal debt at 2% of assessed valuation);
Ky. CONST. § 158 (setting permissible local government debt between 2% and 10% of local
assessed valuation, with debt limit varying according to population of city; county and taxing
district limits set at 2% of assessed valuation); MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (setting county
debt limit at 10% of assessed valuation); N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2-a (setting debt limits for
New York City and Nassau County at 10% of assessed valuation; debt limit for other large
cities is 9% of assessed valuation; debt limit for other cities and counties and for towns and
villages is 7% of assessed valuation).
48. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (providing that local government debts require
approval of two-thirds of local electorate); MIcH. CONST. art. IX, § 15 (providing that state
long-term debt requires approval of two-thirds of members of each house of the legislature
and a majority of state voters in referendum); S.C. CONST. art. X, § 13 (providing that new
state general obligation debt requires approval of either two-thirds of each legislative house or
popular referendum).
49. See GA. CONST. art. X, § V, I I (limiting county and municipal debt to 10% of
assessed valuation; voter approval required); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (limiting state debt
service to 9% of average of state revenues for past three years; three-fifths majority vote in
each house of the legislature required before debt may be incurred).
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As state constitutions can be relatively easily amended, an absolute
prohibition on debt or a low dollar limit on debt can be circumvented by a
constitutional amendment authorizing a specific bond issue. As a result, the
legal requirements for a constitutional amendment - typically, a combination
of a legislative supermajority and voter approval - also become the
requirements for issuance of debt. Thus, although the Alabama Constitution
flatly bars state debt, as of the early 1990s, it contained thirty-three
amendments authorizing specific bond issues. 50
Like the public purpose requirements, the "constitutional moment" 51 for
the birth of debt limitation was the turnpike, canal, and railroad boom of the
1820s and 1830s, the Panic of 1837, and the resulting wave of tax increases
adopted to pay off the state debts blithely assumed during the boom.52 The
first constitutional limits were adopted in the 1840s, and by 1860, nineteen
states had constitutional debt limitations. 53 Most of the Reconstructed
southern states and western states admitted to the Union after the Civil War
included debt limitations in their constitutions. 54 By the early twentieth
century nearly all state constitutions limited the borrowing authority of their
local governments as well. 55
Apart from the specific historical background, constitutional restrictions
on debt may be justified as a means of reconciling the conflict between
short-term and long-term interests that debt generates. When a government
finances a capital project with long-term benefits - such as a bridge, school
building, or prison - it is appropriate to spread the costs of the project over
its useful life. Borrowing the money and repaying the debt over a period of
decades spreads the cost to the future generations who will benefit from the
project. However, the ability to shift the costs forward may also induce
elected officials to incur too much debt. The benefits of the project financed
by the debt will be received immediately, while the costs of paying off the
debt are deferred into the future. As a result, current elected officials may be
50. See WnILIAM H. STEWART, THE ALABAMA CoNsTITmoN: A REmRENcE GUnDE 115-
16 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1994); see also James H. White, III, Constitutional Authority to Issue
Debt, 33 CumB. L. REv. 561, 565 (2002) (noting that Alabama state debt issued "numerous
times" by constitutional amendment).
51. Cf Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93"
YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984) (presenting theory of "constitutional moments").
52. See RATCHRORD, supra note 21, at 73-104.
53. Id. at 122.
54. Id. at 122, 167-68.
55. By 1938, forty-five of the forty-eight states had some limitations on state borrowing;
the only exceptions were the three New England states of Connecticut, New Hampshire and
Vermont. See id. at 430-31.
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tempted to approve projects that are not fully cost-justified. After all, they
can get the credit for the new project immediately, while the blame for the
additional taxes needed to pay off the debt will be borne by their successors.
A central justification of constitutional limits on debt is to offset the
temptations that can cause elected officials to burden future generations with
unnecessary debt. Constitutional control can provide a constraint likely to be
missing from the ordinary political process.
B. Legislative Evasion and Judicial Ratification
1. The Revenue Bond
Like the public purpose requirements, the state debt limitations have not
had quite the effect their terms suggest. State constitutions typically require
the state or locality to pledge its "full faith and credit" in support of its debt.
This means that such a debt is a "general obligation" of the state or locality,
backed not by a particular revenue source, but by the full revenue-raising
capacity of the borrowing government. 56 Constitutional debt limitations
apply to such debt. However, stimulated in part by the desire to avoid the
substantive caps and voter approval requirements of the state constitutions,
states and localities have developed financial instruments, what I refer to as
"non-debt debts,' 57 that enable them to borrow without pledging their full
faith and credit. Instead, the debt is backed only by a specific revenue
source. As a result of state judicial interpretation, or, in some states,
constitutional amendment, these "non-guaranteed" or "revenue bond" debts
are typically not subject to the constitutional limitations that apply to general
obligation debt. Today, most state and local borrowing does not involve
general obligation debt, but instead uses non-debt debts that avoid the pledge
of full faith and credit and thus escape the constitutional debt limitations.
Initially, the only revenue bonds exempt from the debt limitations were
project finance bonds, e.g., bonds issued to finance a project whose revenues
would be used to pay off the debt incurred to finance the project. For
example, to build a bridge, the state might issue a bond, promise the bond
buyers to impose a toll on the bridge financed by the bond, and pledge the
revenues generated by the bridge toll to repay the bonds.58 State courts
found that as long as the state limited its debt service payment obligation to
56. See, e.g., Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y.
1976).
57. See discussion infra Part III.C.
58. See RATcH oRD, supra note 21, at 498, 503-06.
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the "special fund" generated by the project, such a revenue bond was not
debt subject to the debt limit.
59
Over time, the special fund concept spread well beyond debts backed
solely by charges imposed on facilities financed by the borrowing. Courts
found that bonds to finance highway construction were exempt from debt
limitations if they were backed by taxes on motor fuels and vehicle license
fees. This was based on the theory that new highways would generate
additional auto usage and additional fuel tax and fee revenues and, thus, the
costs of repaying the debt would not be borne by the taxpayers. 60 Similarly,
a bond issued to finance a convention center might not be "debt" within the
meaning of the constitutional constraint if it was backed by a new tax on
hotel occupancy. This was done on the theory that the convention center
would promote hotel use, generate the necessary new hotel tax revenues, and
thus not threaten future taxpayers. 61 The cases are not always consistent,
62
but the trend has been to loosen the nexus required between the project
financed by the bond and the revenues committed to paying off the
obligation in order to justify avoidance of the debt limitations. 63
2. Lease-Financing
Another important technique for avoiding debt limitations has been lease
financing. Lease financing extends the revenue bond concept - and the
attendant exemption from debt restrictions - from the creation of new
revenue-generating infrastructure to the construction of new government
facilities. In a lease-financing scenario, a private firm or a public authority
issues the necessary bonds and builds the facility. Private debts are not
subject to constitutional debt limits, and virtually all state courts have held
that the debts of public authorities are not debts in the constitutional sense
because the authorities lack the capacity to impose taxes or pledge the full
faith and credit of the state or local government. 64 To finance the bond, the
59. Id. at 446-66.
60. See, e.g., In re Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1998).
61. See, e.g., Convention Ctr. Auth. v. Anzai, 890 P.2d 1197 (Haw. 1995).
62. See, e.g., Eakin v. State ex rel. Capital Improvement Bd., 474 N.E.2d 62, 67 (Ind.
1985) (holding that bond used to finance a convention center and backed by taxes on hotels,
motels, and retail food business is "debt" within the meaning of debt limit).
63. The special fund exemption may not be available if the state is dedicating a pre-
existing revenue source to pay off a bond, rather than creating a new tax or increasing the
amount to be paid under an existing tax. See Opinion of the Justices, 665 So. 2d 1357, 1362-
63 (Ala. 1995); State ex reL Marockie v. Wagoner, 438 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1993).
64. See Train Unlimited Corp. v. Iowa Ry. Fin. Auth., 362 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1985);
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state or local government enters into an arrangement with a private firm or
public authority bond issuer to lease the bond-financed facility for a period
of time, with the government's lease payments covering the annual debt
service. In theory, the state or local debt payment is rental for the use of the
bond-financed facility. Courts have long held that long-term contracts for the
purchase of basic operating goods and services, such as electricity, water,
solid waste disposal or space for government offices, are not subject to
constitutional debt limitations. 65 Although such a contract raises a danger of
long-term commitment akin to that posed by debt, these long-term contracts
have been held not to be debt so long as the government's duty to pay is tied
to the receipt of service when the payment is made.66 Thus, a long-term
rental agreement does not create "debt" in the constitutional sense.
In most contemporary lease-financings the state or local "rent" payment
is based not on the market value of the lease but on the private firm's or
public authority's debt service requirements. Nevertheless, as long as the
government's commitment to make payments is contingent on its use of the
facility and is subject to annual legislative appropriation, most courts have
found that the commitment is not "debt" in the constitutional sense.
67
3. Subject-to-Appropriation Debt
Subject-to-appropriation debt, which emerged in the closing decades of
the twentieth century, dramatically expands the opportunities for evasion.
Subject-to-appropriation debt - also known as "contract debt" - takes the
lease-financing model of public authority issuance backed by state or local
contract payments one step further by dispensing with the need for the
government backing the debt to obtain anything of value from the issuer.
Rather, a public authority, special district, or other entity not subject to
constitutional restriction issues a bond, uses the borrowed funds to undertake
a project for the state or local government, and then enters into a contract
with the state or local government in which that government agrees to make
Schulz v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1994); Dykes v. N. Va. Trans. Dist. Comm'n, 411
S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1991).
65. See, e.g., Crowder v. Town of Sullivan, 28 N.E. 94 (Ind. 1891); Struble v. Nelson,
15 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Minn. 1944); Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Co. v. Massey, 169 S.E.2d
556, 559 (Va. 1969); State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Hall, 441 S.E.2d 386, 389 (W. Va.
1994).
66. Hal, 441 S.E.2d at 389.
67. See Bulman v. McCrane, 312 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1973); Dep't of Ecology v. State Fin.
Comm., 804 P.2d 1241 (Wash. 1991); Dieck v. Unified Sch. Dist. of Antigo, 477 N.W.2d 613
(Wis. 1991). But see Montano v. Gabaldon, 766 P.2d 1328 (N.M. 1989).
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an annual payment to the authority equal to the annual debt service on the
authority's bond. So long as the state's or local government's payment to the
authority is subject to annual appropriation, and any duty to make an annual
appropriation is specifically disclaimed, most state courts which have
considered this device have concluded that the state or local contractual
commitment to cover the authority's debt service is not a "debt" subject to
state constitutional constraint.68 In other words, by nominally limiting its
liability, the state or local government avoids creating "debt."
'69
Subject-to-appropriation borrowing resembles moral obligation debt,
which loomed large in municipal finance in the 1960s and 1970s. 70 Under
the moral obligation scenario, a public authority issued a bond, which would
be backed by authority revenues, typically revenues to be generated by the
facility to be financed by the bond. When the authority, or the potential
investor, was uncertain whether the facility so financed would be able to
produce the necessary revenues, the state would make a non-binding
commitment of state funds to cover debt service in the event that revenues
from the bond-financed project fell short. The state's moral obligation
provided a psychologically significant safety net for public authority bond
issues for moderate-income housing, hospitals, universities, and mental
68. See Carr-Gottstein Props. v. State, 899 P.2d 136 (Alaska 1995); In re Anzai, 936
P.2d 637 (Haw. 1997); Wilson v. Ky. Transp. Cabinet, 884 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1994);
Employers Ins. Co. of Nev. v. State Bd. of Exam'rs, 21 P.3d 628 (Nev. 2001); Schulz v. State,
639 N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1994); Fent v. Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 984 P.2d 200 (Okla.
1999); Dykes v. N. Va. Transp. Dist. Comm'n, 411 S.E.2d I (Va. 1991).
69. In one very recent case, even the arguable absence of such a disclaimer was
unnecessary as the court proved willing to read one into the authorizing legislation. In the
summer of 2003, the New York state legislature created a complex financing scheme that
would permit the use of state sales tax receipts to back bonds that would be issued to refinance
the debt of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), and thus reduce New York City's
current fiscal year MAC interest obligation, and thereby enable the City to close its annual
budget deficit. The legislature, however, may have failed to make it clear that the sales tax
payments were subject to annual appropriation; indeed, one provision of the law appeared to
make the "subject to appropriation" language inapplicable to this arrangement. See N.Y. PuB.
Autm. LAw §§ 3238-a, 3240(5) (McKinney 2003). When the arrangement was challenged, the
trial court noted the "poor draftsmanship," but observed that if the "subject to appropriation"
language did not apply that would lead to "the absurd result of attributing the intent of
enacting a statute that is facially unconstitutional, thus, negating the very payments the
Legislature sought to establish .... [A] poorly drafted provision should not overcome the
overriding purpose of the statute" - that is, use of a constitutionally acceptable financing
device to circumvent the debt limitation. Local Government Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax
Asset Receivable Corp., 230 N.Y. L.J. 17, 17 (2003).




institutions. 7 1 State courts generally concluded that the legislature's mere
"moral" obligation to appropriate debt service did not constitute a debt
triggering the constitutional debt limitations.72 The moral obligation device,
however, came under a cloud in the mid-1970s when New York State had to
come to the rescue of its Urban Development Corporation (UDC) and make
good on its moral obligation to support the UDC.
7 3
In one sense, subject-to-appropriation debt is less troubling that moral
obligation debt since states typically did not make any initial appropriation
to the authority issuing the moral obligation bond but rather acted on the
hopeful assumption that they would never have to spend state funds to make
good on their "obligation." That may have created the illusion that moral
obligation debt was cost-free to the state, and may have led states to take on
such obligations too easily. By contrast, contemporary subject-to-
appropriation obligations assume the regular appropriation of public funds to
the authority issuing the debt, and thus can be factored into budget
projections and counted as part of regularly recurring government costs. The
fiscal illusion inherent in the moral obligation bond is thus avoided. Yet, by
treating subject-to-appropriation obligations as part of baseline expenses, the
states have only underscored the degree to which this device exists solely to
evade the debt limits. These bonds do not involve using the state to provide
extra security for public authority bonds; instead, their only purpose is to
enable the state to use a public authority to circumvent the state constitution.
Subject-to-appropriation debt has become increasingly widespread.
According to a 2001 statement issued by Standard & Poor's, a leading bond
rating agency, "this type of debt issuance is now common in at least 33
states."' 74 One recent court decision found that courts in thirty-two states had
upheld some form of subject-to-appropriation debt. 75 Default levels have
been comparable to those of full faith and credit general obligation bonds.
"[W]hile appropriation-backed bonds are not considered debt under a strict
legal definition, Standard & Poor's considers all appropriation-backed bonds
of an issuer to be an obligation of that issuer and a failure to appropriate will
71. Id. at 57-60.
72. See Steup v. Ind. Hous. Fin. Auth., 402 N.E.2d 1215 (Ind. 1980); Utah Hous. Fin.
Agency v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1977); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 208 N.W.2d
780 (Wis. 1973).
73. See generally N.Y. STATE MoRaIAD ACT COMM'N, RESTORING CREDIT AND
CONFiDENCE: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON THE URBAN DEvELOPMENT CORPORATION AND
OTHER STATE FINANCING AuTHoRIEs (1976).
74. Richard J. Marino & Colleen Waddell, Revised Lease and Appropriation-Backed
Debt, STANDARD & PooR's RATING SERVICES, June 13, 2001.
75. Lonegan v. State, 819 A.2d 395, 404 n.2 (N.J. 2003) [hereinafter Lonegan 11].
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result in a considerable credit deterioration for all types of debt issued by the
defaulting government."
76
Indeed, even as they have held that subject-to-appropriation agreements
are beyond the scope of constitutional debt limitations, many state courts
have candidly acknowledged that the state or locality behind the obligation
will do its best to assure that the annual appropriations are made, since
failure to make the appropriation would surely have a dramatically negative
impact on the state's or locality's own bond rating and interest rates. As the
California Supreme Court has stated, "[W]e are not na've about the character
of this transaction." 77 Yet, these "practical consequences" have usually not
been enough to trigger the application of state constitutional debt
constraints. 78 Instead, courts have relied on the state's or local government's
formal disclaimer of legal obligation to pay debt service as conclusively
eliminating the central threat of state or local debt - the danger to future
taxpayers of long-term financial commitments. As a result, state debt
limitations need not and do not apply to subject-to-appropriation debt.79
Not all state judges have been happy with this development. Many of the
cases in which state supreme courts have found subject-to-appropriation
agreements are not debt have been marked by close votes and sharp dissents,
with the dissenters decrying the evisceration of the constitutional debt
limitations and calling for a "common sense" or realistic interpretation that
would recognize that these borrowings are binding in practice. 80 Yet, the
steady trend has been to exempt these agreements from debt limitations.
76. Marino & Waddell, supra note 74.
77. Rider v. City of San Diego, 959 P.2d 347, 358 (Cal. 1998).
78. See Wilson v. Ky. Transp. Cabinet, 884 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Ky. 1994) ("The
argument that the practical consequences [of subject-to-appropriation debt] produce some
kind of constitutional general obligation is without merit .... Practical, moral or righteous
claims do not pass the test of contract or constitutional law."); Employers Ins. Co. of Nev. v.
State Bd. of Exam'rs, 21 P.3d 628, 632 (Nev. 2001) (rejecting argument from "realism"). A
handful of state courts have given greater weight to practical effects in assessing whether an
obligation is "debt" within the meaning of a state's constitution. See State ex rel. Ohio Funds
Mgmt. Bd. v. Walker, 561 N.E.2d 927, 932 (Ohio 1990) (noting obligation to be considered
"nut only for what it purports to be, but what it actually is"); Winkler v. Sch. Bldg. Auth., 434
S.E.2d 420, 433, 435 (W. Va. 1993) (noting that the court was unwilling to
"abandon... logic and common sense" and finding that "where the only source of funds for
revenue bonds [was] general appropriations, it defie[d] logic to say that the f1legislature ha[d]
no obligation to fund such bonds.").
79. See Wilson, 884 S.W.2d at 644; Enourato v. N.J. Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449, 456
(N.J. 1982); Dep't of Ecology v. State Fin. Comm., 804 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Wash. 1991).
80. See Wilson, 884 S.W.2d at 646-67 (Stumbo, J., dissenting) ("Through smoke and
mirrors we have allowed debt to be labelled something else for too long. The economic reality
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In 2002, the New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to signal a shift to a
more critical review of subject-to-appropriation debt.81 In Lonegan 1, the
court considered a challenge to $8.6 billion in bonds for repairing and
constructing new public schools - the "largest, most comprehensive school
construction program in the nation."' 82 The bonds were to be issued by a
state authority, and backed by a contract pursuant to which the state
committed, subject to annual appropriation, to pay the authority an amount
each year that would cover the costs of debt service. As the state's obligation
was subject-to-appropriation, the voter approval the New Jersey Constitution
requires for new state debt was neither sought nor obtained. The state
supreme court expressed serious doubt about the propriety of the
appropriation contract device, but ultimately concluded that as the school
construction program involved the "provision of constitutionally required
' 83
educational facilities and was a direct response to the court's own orders in
New Jersey's longstanding school funding litigation, the financing plan did
not violate the state's debt limitation provision.84 The court, however,
intimated that subject-to-appropriation debts outside the shelter of the state's
education finance requirements might be subject to challenge. 85 Noting that
New Jersey's growing use of subject-to-appropriation debt raised the
"troubling question" of whether the state's debt limitation "retains its
purpose and vitality" and warning that "[a] literal interpretation of the Debt
Limitation Clause that eviscerates the strictures the Clause expressly
contains cannot serve the constitutional mandate, ' 86 the court set down for
reargument the question of whether subject-to-appropriation debt outside the
school facilities setting is "debt" in the constitutional sense.
87
is that these bonds are debts of the Commonwealth."); Fent v. Okla. Capital Improvement
Auth., 984 P.2d 200, 211-15 (Okla. 1999) (Lavender, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("no amount of legal semantics, word-massaging or linguistic subterfuge can turn this
express commitment into some non-enforceable moral obligation to repay"); Dep't of Ecology
v. State Fin. Comm., 804 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Dore, J., dissenting) (arrangement "violates both
the letter and spirit" of the Washington debt limit); id. at 1255 (a "commonsense
interpretation" of the debt limit requires that subject-to-appropriation debt be treated as debt);
id. at 1257 (the "escape hatch" provided by the non-appropriation clause "is really an illusory
one").
81. Lonegan v. State, 809 A.2d 91 (N.J. 2002) [hereinafter Lonegan 1].
82. Id. at 104.
83. id. at 105.
84. Id. at 104-07.
85. See generally id.
86. Id. at 93.
87. See id. at 109. The plaintiffs had attacked a number of state financing schemes, in
addition to the school-funding program, that combined authority-issued debt and state debt
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Ultimately, however, the court drew back from the brink and nine
months later sustained the general exemption of subject-to-appropriation
debt from the state's constitutional debt restriction.8 8 The court held that the
constitutional limits apply only to "debt that is legally enforceable against
the State . -89 Because "the State is not legally bound" to pay debt
service on subject-to-appropriation debt "and can opt not to do so," subject-
to-appropriation debt is not subject to constitutional limitation.90 To be sure,
"the State acknowledge[d] that payments on appropriation debt are 'highly
likely"' 9 1 as "non-payment would adversely affect the State's credit
rating." 92 Yet, the state's nominal freedom not to pay debt service was
doctrinally decisive.
C. Consequences of Evasion
As a result of the rise of revenue bonds, lease-financing arrangements,
subject-to-appropriation debt, and other various evasive techniques, nearly
three-quarters of all state debt and two-thirds of city and county debt are
"non-debt debts" exempt from the panoply of substantive limitations on and
procedural requirements for debt found in state constitutions. 93 Debt limits
have affected the form of state and local debt, but they do not appear to have
significantly affected the total amount of debt. 94
service contracts to avoid the state's constitutional debt restriction. Id.
88. Lonegan 11, 819 A.2d 395 (N.J. 2002). The Lonegan I decision, directing that the
question of subject-to-appropriation debt be set down for re-argument, was decided by a vote
of 6 to 1, with the dissenter voting to invalidate all future subject-to-appropriation debt
arrangements, other than the school facilities financing scheme, without need for re-argument.
Lonegan 1, 809 A.2d at 132 (Stein, J., dissenting). Lonegan H1 sustained the constitutionality
of subject-to-appropriation debt by a vote of 4 to 3. 819 A.2d at 407. Chief Justice Poritz
wrote the opinions for the court in both cases. Id. at 397; Lonegan 1, 809 A.2d at 93.
89. Lonegan 11, 819 A.2d at 402.
90. Id. at 405.
91. ld. at 406.
92. Id.
93. See WniriA D. VALENTE ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL
GovERNm[ENT LAW 647 (William D. Valente ed., 5th ed. 2001) (reporting debt figures for
1996).
94. James C. Clingermayer & B. Dan Wood, Disentangling Patterns of State Debt
Financing, 89 AM. POL Sci. REv. 108, 116 (1995) (stating that debt limitations "have no
statistically significant impact on net increases in state debt"). To be sure, as Professor Stewart
Sterk has pointed out to me, it is unlikely that debt limitations have no impact on the overall
level of state and local borrowing. Some debts may not be capable of shifting to revenue bond
form, and the costs of evading debt limitations may discourage some avoidance efforts.
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The debt limitations, however, are not without consequences. Evading
state constitutions has costs. In order to avoid falling into the category of
constitutional debt, these instruments avoid pledging the full faith and credit
of the state or locality, and they limit the recourse of lenders seeking
principal and interest payments to certain funds. As a result they present a
slightly greater risk to investors, and thus usually carry a slightly higher
interest rate than general obligation bonds.95 They also involve greater
administrative and legal costs than general obligation debt since issuers not
pledging full faith and credit have to provide lenders with other forms of
security. Over time, as the bond market has grown familiar and comfortable
with these debts, the interest rate differential between the guaranteed and
non-guaranteed obligations of the same jurisdiction has narrowed. However,
some distinction usually continues, and the higher administrative costs of
issuing these bonds remains.
Debt limitations, or the state and local efforts at avoiding them, have
also contributed to the baroque structure of state and local government, and
to the major role played by un-elected public authorities and similar agencies
that are technically independent of the state or of general purpose local
governments. 96 Unless the state constitution specifically provides otherwise,
state courts have generally found that because public authorities lack the
power to impose taxes or to pledge the full faith and credit of their states,
public authority debt is not subject to constitutional debt limits.97 As a
result, in many states, public authorities have become conduits for the
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that debt limitations have had a significant effect on debt levels.
As Professor Clayton Gillette has recently written, even when local officials have sought to
comply with debt restrictions by submitting bond issues to voter approval, if the voters do
reject the debt proposal, officials may still be able to finance the same project through an
alternative borrowing mechanism not subject to the voter approval requirement. See Clayton
P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, XXX J. CoNTrEMP. LEGAL IssuEs (forthcoming 2004)
(New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 69, at 13-17) [hereinafter Gillette, Direct Democracy]. However, Professor Gillette
concludes that voter approval requirements may have some effect in constraining local
officials from overinvesting in capital spending. See id. at 42-53.
95. This has long been the case. See RATCHRlRD, supra note 21, at 514 (noting that "the
most definite and tangible disadvantage of revenue bonds in comparison with general state
obligations is their greater interest cost").
96. See, e.g., Beverly S. Bunch, The Effect of Constitutional Debt Limits on State
Governments' Use of Public Authorities, 68 PuB. CHoicE 57 (1991).
97. See Rider v. City of San Diego, 959 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1998); Albuquerque Metro
Arroyo Flood Control Auth. v. Swinburne, 394 P.2d 998 (N.M. 1964); Ragsdale v. City of
Memphis, 70 S.W.2d 56,68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
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"backdoor financing" of appropriation-backed debt.98 The evasion of debt
limits has been an important stimulus to the creation of public authorities,
particularly those controlling public infrastructure. These authorities have
been repeatedly criticized for their lack of accountability to state and local
voters and for the resulting fragmentation of state and local infrastructure
policies and management. 99
IV. TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS: PROPOSITION 13 AND THE STATE
FISCAL CONSTITUTION
State constitutional provisions dealing with taxation and expenditure
levels are both less widespread and more diverse than public purpose
requirements and debt limitation provisions. Some state constitutions are
silent on the subject; in others, the tax provisions, like those in the Federal
Constitution, are primarily facilitative or structural rather than restrictive.
They authorize certain kinds of taxation, determine which level of
government shall levy what kind of tax, or establish the basic ground rules
for taxation, such as the requirement of uniformity of assessments and
rates, 100 the classification of different categories of property or activity for
different rates of taxation, or the provision of exemptions from taxation.
These provisions may have some effect on state and local tax policy and may
indirectly limit overall revenues, 10 1 but their thrust is to define and assure
the equal treatment of taxpayers rather than to limit tax levels per se.
98. See Rider, 959 P.2d at 359; Schulz v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1994); Fent v.
Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 984 P.2d 200, 210 (Okla. 1999); Dykes v. N. Va. Transp.
Dist. Comm'n, 411 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Va. 1991).
99. For critical appraisals of the role of public authorities in state and local governance,
see DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE MACHINERY OF GREED: PuBLIc AuTHORny ABUSE AND WHAT
TO Do ABOUT IT (1986); ANNMARiE HAUCK WALSH, THE PuBLic's BusINEss: THE PoLrncs
AND PRACTICES OFGOVERNMENT CORPORATIONs (1980). For a more balanced assessment, see
PuBLIc AuTHoRmEs AND PumLc PoLIcy: THE BusINESs OF GovERNmEN'r (Jerry Mitchell ed.,
1992).
100. Almost all state constitutions contain some provisions for equal or uniform taxes.
See, e.g., JEROME R. HELERsTEN & WALTER HaLERSTEN, STATE AND LOCAL TAxATION:
CASES & MATERIALS 34 (6th ed. 1997). In some states this applies to all taxes. See GA.
CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subject within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax"). In other states, the uniformity or equality
requirement is focused on the property tax. See IND. CoNST. art. X, § 1 ("uniform and equal
rate of property assessment and taxation"); ME. CONST. art. IX, § 8 ("all taxes upon real and
personal estate... shall be apportioned and assessed equally").
101. By requiring equal levels of taxation for all taxpayers, the uniformity clause
makes it more difficult for state and localities to tax commercial property owners or
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Tax limitation, however, is an important theme in the state fiscal
constitution, and one of growing significance. More than half the state
constitutions include some substantive or procedural limitation on the level
of state or local taxing or the level of spending funded by own-source
revenues. Although some constitutional measures are addressed to the sales
tax, 102 the income tax, 103 or taxation generally, 104 most limitations are
focused on the property tax - historically the most important form of
subnational taxation and still the single most important form of local own-
source revenue. 
105
Like the debt limitations, tax limits take many forms: limits on the
property tax rate;106 limits on the increase in assessed valuation and thus on
the year-to-year change in the tax liability of the property owner;10 7 limits
on the rate of increase in state expenditures and in the revenues needed to
corporations at a higher rate than residential property owners or individuals. Many states have
addressed this problem by amending their constitutions to permit the classification of
taxpayers into different groups - such as commercial and residential property owners - and
then requiring uniformity of treatment only within the designated classes. Uniformity also
poses an obstacle to the graduated income tax. "A graduated income tax by its very nature
lacks the uniformity of taxation typically required by state constitutional restrictions. A
controversy which raged throughout the country, as states enacted income tax levies, was
whether the income tax constituted a property tax that violated the uniformity provisions." See
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTuN, supra note 100, at 36.
102. See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (capping the sales tax rate); accord MONT. CONST.
art. VII, § 16.
103. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (prohibiting personal income tax); MICH. CONST. art.
IX, § 7 (prohibiting graduated income tax); N.C. CONST. art. V, § 6 (limiting income tax);
TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (prohibiting personal income tax without voter approval).
104. See CAL. CONST. art. XHIA, § 3 (requiring state legislative supermajorities in
order to increase state taxes); id. art. XIIID (making voter approval a requirement for all tax
increases); DEL. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 10, 11 (requiring legislative supermajorities for imposing
or increasing a tax or a fee); MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 25 (requiring voter approval as condition
for new or increased state or local taxes); Mo. CONST. art. X, §§ 18, 22 (setting tax limits and
conditioning new or increased taxes and fees on voter approval); S.D. CONST. art. XI, §§ 13,
14 (requiring either legislative supermajority or voter approval in order to increase state taxes
or the property tax).
105. See VALENTE ET AL., supra note 93, at 489.
106. See ARiz. CONST. art. IX, § 18; CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 9; LA. CONST. art. VI, § 6; MO. CONST. art. X, § 11; NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; NEv.
CONST. art. X, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10; OFHo CONST. art. XII, § 2; WASH. CONST. art.
VII, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. XV, §§ 5-7.
107. See ARIz. CONST. art. IX, § 19; CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 4; LA. CONST. art. VI, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 8B; OR.
CONST. art. XI, § 1 l(1)(b).
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fund them; 10 8 and requirements that new or increased taxes be subject to
either a legislative supermajority or voter approval (sometimes with popular
supermajorities). 109
1. Proposition 13 and Its Aftermath
The earliest tax limitations appeared in state statutes during the 1870s
and 1880s and were later incorporated in many state constitutions. 110 These
statutes capped property tax rates at a fraction of property values. A "second
round of constitutional tax limitations appeared during the Depression of the
1930s. They were aimed at forcing tax reductions, thereby stemming the tide
of tax delinquencies and tax foreclosures of residential property." 111 But the
most important event in the development of tax limitations - the
"constitutional moment" for tax limitation comparable to the Panic of 1837
and its aftermath for public purpose and debt limitations - was in June 1978
when California adopted Proposition 13.112
Proposition 13 was a response to soaring property taxes in California, a
surge attributable to housing price inflation, which was "translated
automatically into higher assessed valuations." 113 When local governments
failed to lower property tax rates and the state legislature failed to provide
tax relief, Howard Jarvis, "a longtime opponent of government spending and
ardent champion of lower taxes, organized a campaign" to get a tax relief
constitutional amendment on the ballot and enacted by the voters.
114
Although it built on popular concern about the property tax, Proposition
13's reach swept well beyond that tax. Its initial provision was a relatively
108. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 17; CAL. CONST. XIIIB, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. X,
§ 20; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 18; FLA. CONST. VII, § 1; HAw. CONST. art. VII, § 9; LA.
CONST. art. VII, § 10; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 26; MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 18, 20; S.C. CONST.
art. X, § 7.
109. See ARIz. CONST. art. IX, § 22; CAL. CONST. arts. XIIIA, XIIIC, XIIID; COLO.
CONST. art. X, § 20; DEz. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 6, 10, 11; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6, 11; HAW.
CONST. art. VII, § 9; LA. CONST. art. VI, § 25; id. art. VII, § 2; MicH. CONST. art. IX, § 25;
MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 18, 22; S.C. CONST. art. X, § 7.
110. M. DAVID GELFAND ET AL, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE IN A
NUTSHELL 38 (2d ed. 2000).
111. Id.
112. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA; see Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U.
L. REv. 191, 192 (2001) ("Proposition 13 marked a watershed moment in the evolution of
American attitudes toward government and taxation.")
113. Stark, supra note 112, at 197.
114. Id. at 198.
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traditional cap on the property tax rate as a percentage of property value; 115
other provisions broke new constitutional ground. Section 2 rolled back
property assessments, 116  but more significantly, limited future
reassessments, except upon change in ownership, to the lesser of 2% per
year or the rate of inflation. 117 This measure, which has been emulated by
six other state constitutions, 118 secures property owners against inflation,
while producing significantly different tax liabilities for owners of
identically valued parcels, depending on when they were purchased. 119
Section 3 went beyond the property tax by requiring that any increase in any
state tax must first be adopted by a two-thirds vote in each house of the
legislature. 120 Section 4 provided that a city, county, or special district may
impose a "special tax" in addition to the now-restricted property tax only
with the approval of two-thirds of local voters. 12 1
Proposition 13 had a catalytic effect, sparking tax revolts and anti-tax
constitutional amendments around the country. 122 Some of these focused on
the property tax, while others, like Proposition 13 itself, were far more
ambitious.
Just a few months after California acted, Michigan voters adopted an
amendment which conditioned local tax increases on voter approval,
imposed legislative supermajority requirements for increases in state taxes,
and limited future increases in state revenues.123 The measure required that
a state revenue limit be
equal to the product of the ratio of Total State Revenues in fiscal year 1978-
79 divided by the Personal Income of Michigan in calendar year 1977
115. CAL CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1.
116. Id. §2.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
119. Proposition 13's imposition of "acquisition value" assessment and the resulting
disparities in the tax treatment of comparably valued properties has been sustained against
arguments that it violates the Federal Equal Protection Clause. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 10-18 (1992); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1292-94 (Cal. 1978).
120. CAL CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3.
121. ld. §4.
122. Over the next dozen years, fourteen states imposed limitations on the growth of
state taxes and expenditures, and twenty-three imposed limits on local property tax revenue
growth, including ten that adopted new or more restrictive tax rate limits. See Mark Skidmore,
Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Relationships Between State and Local
Governments, 99 PUB. CHOICE 77, 83, 88 (1999).
123. MICH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 25-32.
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multiplied by the Personal Income of Michigan in either the prior calendar
year or the average of Personal Income of Michigan in the previous three
calendar years, whichever is greater. 1
24
The amendment prohibited the state legislature from imposing "taxes of any
kind which, together with all other revenues of the state, federal aid
excluded, exceed the revenue limit." 125 This limit can be exceeded only if
the governor's declaration of emergency is confirmed by the vote of two-
thirds of each house of the legislature. 126 Missouri quickly followed suit
with its Hancock Amendment, which imposed a similar set of restrictions on
Missouri's state and local governments. 127 In 1979, California voters
adopted a second initiative, which followed Headlee and Hancock by
imposing limits on the growth of state spending.
128
In the years that followed, at least eight additional states - Alaska,
129
Arizona, 130  Connecticut, 13 1  Delaware, 132  Florida,
1 33  Hawai' i, 134
Louisiana, 135 and South Carolina1 36 - adopted constitutional measures that
impose, or require the state legislature to impose, state revenue or
expenditure limitations based on the growth in state population, the cost of
living, or some combination of these measures relative to a baseline year,
and also require legislative supermajorities before the legislature can alter or
124. Id. § 26.
125. In any fiscal year in which total state revenues exceed the revenue limit by 1% or
more, the constitution requires:
[T]he excess revenues shall be refunded pro rata based on the liability reported on the
Michigan income tax and single business tax (or its successor tax or taxes) annual
returns filed following the close of such fiscal year. If the excess is less than 1%, this
excess may be transferred to the State Budget Stabilization Fund.
Id.
126. Id. § 27.
127. Mo. CONST. art. X, §§ 16-22.
128. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB.
129. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 16 (limiting increases in state appropriations according
to population growth and the rate of inflation, using 1981 as a baseline year).
130. Aim. CoNsT. art. IX, § 17 (providing for state spending limit, which may be
exceeded only by two-thirds vote in each house).
131. CONN. CoNsT. art. III, § 18 (limiting increases in state spending).
132. DEL CoNST. art. VIII, § 6 (requiring legislative supermajority for increase in state
expenditure level).
133. FLA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1 (limiting increase in state revenue).
134. HAw. CoNsT. art. VII, § 9 (providing for limit on increases in state expenditures).
135. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (setting state spending limit).
136. S.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 7 (requiring legislature to limit growth in state spending;
limit can be changed only be two-thirds legislative vote).
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exceed these limits. 137 Similarly, a number of states have followed
California, Michigan, and Missouri in making voter approval a prerequisite
for new or increased local taxes.
138
2. Tax Limitations and the Rise of Non-Tax Revenues
Modem tax and expenditure limitations appear to have had a real impact
on state and local finances. Property tax levels, as well as the role of the
property tax in financing local government, have dropped sharply across the
United States, particularly in the states that adopted the most stringent
property tax limitations. 139 The effects of the comprehensive state revenue
or expenditure limitations on state government are more uncertain, however,
with some researchers finding they have had little effect, 140 while others
conclude that they have slowed government revenue growth. 
14 1
The effect of the tax limits in holding down the property tax, however,
have been offset to some degree by increases in other local taxes and,
especially, by the dramatic growth in the local use of fees, user charges, and
special assessments. 142 The rise in these "non-tax taxes" has had multiple
policy, ideological, and political causes - but surely evasion of the tax limits
is one of them.
137. See supra notes 129-36.
138. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20; WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (noting that ad
valorem taxation of property at a rate greater than 1% of full cash value requires approval by a
supermajority of voters); see also Stark, supra note 112, at 203-06 (discussing efforts to add
voter approval requirements in Montana, Washington, Arizona, Oregon, and Florida). The
Louisiana Constitution requires both houses of its legislature to approve new or increased
local taxes before they can take effect. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
139. See Terri A. Sexton et al., Proposition 13: Unintended Effects and Feasible
Reforms, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 99, 107 (1999) (finding that in California, the share of county
revenue from the property tax dropped from 33.2% in 1977-78 to 11.6% in 1995-96).
140. See, e.g., Ronald J. Shadbegian, Do Tax and Expenditure Limitations Affect the
Size and Growth of State Government?, 14 CoNTeM. ECON. PoL'Y 22 (1996) (finding that
tax and expenditure limitations are little more than "political cover for state legislatures").
141. See Skidmore, supra note 122, at 95.
142. See Gary M. Galles & Robert L. Sexton, A Tale of Two Tax Jurisdictions: The
Surprising Effects of California's Proposition 13 and Massachusetts' Proposition 2 16, 57
AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 123 (1998) (finding that local governments made up lost property tax
revenues through increased non-tax fees and charges); Sexton et al., supra note 139, at 107
(noting that in California cities, the percentage of current revenue from service charges rose
from 25% in 1997-78 to 41% in 1995-96). In 1992, fees and charges accounted for 14.6% of
total local revenues and 23% of local own-source revenues. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON




There are many reasons, apart from the proliferation of tax limitations,
for the increased utilization of special assessments, fees, and charges. Fees
can promote efficiency by requiring the user of a municipal service to
internalize the costs of her use. So, too, it can be argued that it is more
equitable for the principal beneficiaries of a public service or neighborhood
improvement to pay for it through a special assessment or fee than to have
the community as a whole finance it through the property tax. User charges,
which are earmarked for funding the service for which the charge is
imposed, may provide a more certain source of revenue than general
taxation. The rise of a particular fee - the development impact fee - reflects
a new ambivalence about growth and the desire to make newcomers to a
community pay for the additional services and infrastructure that their
presence necessitates. 143 The move from broad-based taxes to special
charges is clearly tied to a more general turn against redistributive taxation
and a growing preference to link taxes paid to services received. 144 More
generally, with "no new taxes" the dominant mantra of contemporary public
finance, it is not surprising that state and local politicians prefer to raise
revenue through means other than broad-based taxes.
Yet the explosion in special taxes, fees, charges, and assessments at the
state and local level in recent decades is due at least in part to the desire to
evade the legal constraints on taxation resulting from Proposition 13 and its
aftermath. Where the property tax is tightly limited, other taxes and non-tax
revenue sources become far more legally and politically appealing. This has
been facilitated by judicial decisions narrowing the scope of constitutional
restrictions. For example, shortly after Proposition 13's adoption, the
California Supreme Court undermined the amendment's restriction on local
revenue sources other than the property tax.14 5 Section 4 of the amendment
provides that a city, county, or "special district" may impose or increase a
"special tax" only with the approval of two-thirds of local voters. 146 One
reading of this provision might be that it conditions all local taxes other than
the property tax, which is restricted by the amendment's other provisions, on
local voter approval. But the court concluded that "special tax" refers only to
143. See VALENTE ET AL., supra note 93, at 596-616; see generally ALAN A.
ALscHui£R & JOSE GOMEz-IBANEz, REGULATION FOR REvENUE: THE PoLmCAL ECONOMY OF
LAND USE ExACTIONS 77-96 (1993).
144. For a description and sharp criticism of this trend, see Laurie Reynolds, Taxes,
Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What You Pay For" Model of Local Government, 56
FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004).
145. City & County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 648 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1982).
146. CAL CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
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taxes whose proceeds are specially earmarked for a specific program.
147
Taxes that produce revenue for the local general fund were deemed not
"special" and therefore not subject to restriction. 148 Similarly, while the
voters might have thought that "special district" was an omnibus term for the
many types of local governments other than cities and counties, the
California court held that the term applies only to local governments with
the power to impose the property tax.149 As a result, local governments
without power to impose a property tax could adopt other new local taxes
without obtaining supermajority approval from local voters. 15
0
More generally, state courts have exempted a host of special
assessments, fees, and charges from tax limitations. These decisions grow
out of, but often expand, the longstanding judicial determination that fees,
charges, and assessments are not taxes because they lack the hallmarks of
taxation - coercion and potential for retribution. Special assessments are
charges to property to finance new public infrastructure directly adjacent or
connecting to the payer's property, such as street or sidewalk paving, electric
lighting, or connections to water and sewer lines. Special assessments are
coercive; the payer must pay and receive the benefit whether she wants to or
not, but they are not redistributive as the payer must be provided with a
benefit worth at least as much as the assessment paid. Consequently, a
special assessment is considered not to be a tax. 15 1 User charges are not
coercive because the obligation to pay the charge is incurred only when
someone chooses to use the service subject to the charge. Similarly, for a
regulatory fee intended to offset the cost of regulating a fee payer whose
activity imposes some costs on the community, the fee is nominally
voluntary since the duty to pay arises from the payer's decision to undertake
the activity subject to regulation. By not consuming the service or avoiding
the activity, the payer could avoid the charge or fee. So, too, by reducing the
amount of service consumed or the amount of activity subject to regulation,
147. Farrell, 648 P.2d at 940.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 937.
150. L.A. County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 643 P.2d 941, 947 (Cal. 1982). But
see Rider v. County of San Diego, 820 P.2d 1000, 1002-09 (Cal. 1991) (questioning
Richmond and narrowing the scope of the Richmond exemption).
151. See, e.g., McNally v. Township of Teaneck, 379 A.2d 446, 451 (N.J. 1977)
(finding a special assessment not a tax subject to certain constitutional requirements because
the purpose of the assessment was to reimburse the municipality for its expenditure);
Lakewood Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 530 S.W.2d 240, 245-46
(Mo. 1975) (finding that charitable property constitutionally exempt from taxation may be
required to pay a special assessment).
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the payer can reduce her liability. 152 Lacking the coerciveness that is the
hallmark of a tax, user charges and regulatory fees have traditionally been
treated as not subject to many of the rules applicable to taxes.
State courts have not only regularly applied the non-tax treatment of
special assessments, fees, and charges to the new state tax limitations,
153
they have also frequently accepted state and local government efforts to
widen the scope of what may be accomplished by these non-tax taxes. With
the acquiescence of state courts, special assessments have been expanded to
finance a broad array of programs and services that provide diffuse benefits
to relatively large neighborhoods, not just the properties adjacent or
connected to new infrastructure. 154 This has often involved exemption from
a tax limitation. 155 Similarly, some state courts have validated regulatory
fees even when a particular firm's fee is not a result of the costs attributable
to that firm - thereby reducing the ability of the firm to use changes in its
behavior to control its fee liability and thus undermining the voluntary
nature of the fee. 156 This has permitted governments to avoid the special
152. Fees and charges are arguably non-redistributive as well. Since the determination
of whether or not to pay, or how much to pay, is up to the payer, it can be assumed that she
will pay only if the benefit to her from the service or the permit or license to engage in the
regulated activity is greater than the fee charged.
153. See Knox v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 152 (Cal. 1992) (holding that
Proposition 13 does not apply to special assessments); Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City &
County of San Francisco, 234 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding transit development
impact fee not subject to Proposition 13); Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 685, 687-91 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding that Proposition 13 does not apply to fee for
issuance of a building permit); Mills v. County of Trinity, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 675-78 (Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that Proposition 13 does not apply to fees for processing subdivision,
zoning, and land use applications); Zahner v. City of Perryville, 813 S.W.2d 855, 857-60
(Mo. 1991) (finding that Hancock Amendment does not apply to special assessments); City of
Huntington v. Bacon, 473 S.E.2d 743, 751-54 (W. Va. 1996) (fire protection and flood
control fees exempt from tax limitation amendment).
154. See Knox, 841 P.2d at 151 (allowing special assessment for parks); City of Boca
Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1992); 2d Roc-Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 731
A.2d I (N.J. 1999) (allowing assessment for business improvement district).
155. See Knox, 841 P.2d at 151; Evans v. City of San Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Ct.
App. 1992).
156. See Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1997);
Cal. Ass'n of Prof'l Scientists v. Dep't of Fish & Game, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that regulatory fee is not subject to legislative supermajority requirement even when
individual's payment is not tied to the costs of regulating that individual, so long as total fees
collected do not surpass the costs of regulatory programs they support); Nuclear Metals, Inc.
v. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Bd., 656 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1995).
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voting rules required by tax limitation amendments. 157 Other courts have
permitted localities to charge landowners "fees" for traditional municipal
services, such as fire protection and flood control. 158 Combining the
assessment and fee concepts, many state courts have upheld development
impact fees, which require developers to pay in advance for a host of
municipal services and improvements, including new roads, new schools,
and expansions of water supply and sewage systems, required by the
population growth attributable to their developments. These charges pay for
traditional municipal services, are based on property values, and may be
passed along to new homebuyers. But when treated as assessments or fees,
they are not subject to state constitutional constraints on taxation.
159
To be sure, some courts police the fee/tax line more closely and require
that to avoid treatment as a tax, a fee must be truly voluntary and calibrated
according to the payer's use or the cost the payer imposes. 160 Indeed, in a
recent case, the Michigan Supreme Court, expressed its concern that "the
imposition of mandatory 'user fees' by local units of government has been
characterized as one of the most frequent abridgements 'of the spirit, if not
the letter,"' of that state's anti-tax amendment. 16 1 As a result, the Michigan
court indicated it would take a more narrow, traditional approach to the
determination of what is a service charge lest "municipalities supplement
existing revenues by redefining various government activities as 'services'
and enacting a myriad of 'fees' for those services."
162
Moreover, some state constitutions have sought to deal with the
proliferation of assessments, fees, and charges by regulating these as well.
Missouri's Hancock Amendment subjects increases in fees and licenses as
157. See Sinclair Paint Co., 937 P.2d at 1352-53.
158. See City of Huntington v. Bacon, 473 S.E.2d 743 (W. Va. 1996) (sustaining a
municipal fee imposed on all building owners to cover costs of fire and flood protection
services); see also St. Johns County v. N.E. Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991)
(sustaining development impact fee to finance school construction). But see Covel v. City of
Seattle, 905 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1995) (rejecting "residential street utility charge" for
maintaining, repairing, and improving city streets).
159. See Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993
(Ariz. 1997); N.E. Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d at 640-41; Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton
v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000); Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of
Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990).
160. See Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098 (Mass. 1984); Bolt v. City
of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 1998).
161. Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 273.
162. Id. at 272.
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well as local taxes to voter approval. 163 Similarly, in response to the
California Supreme Court's exemption of many special taxes, special
assessments, fees and charges from Proposition 13, California voters in 1996
adopted Proposition 218, which extended the voter approval requirement to
nearly all revenue-raising devices and narrowed the definition of the special
assessments exempt from tax limitations. 164
Yet, even these provisions have been trimmed by courts. The Missouri
Supreme Court determined that, despite the broad reach of the Hancock
Amendment's text, not all fees are actually subject to the constitution's voter
approval requirement. 165 Instead, the court adopted a complicated five-part
test for determining which fees are "tax-fees" subject to the Amendment and
which are true user fees and, thus, exempt from constitutional restriction. 166
Missouri's courts have since divided over whether a range of license fees
and user charges are restricted quasi-taxes or protected fees. 167 The
application of Proposition 218's restrictions has also been uneven; although
a host of local fees are now subject to the requirement of local voter
approval, 168 the California courts have found that many local fees and
assessments remain beyond the scope of the new constitutional limitation. 16 9
163. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 22(a).
164. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIC; id. art. XIIID.
165. Keller v. Marion County Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 304-05 n.10 (Mo.
1991).
166. Jd. at 304.
167. Compare Beatty v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 867 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. 1993)
(holding sewer charge subject to Hancock Amendment's voter approval requirement), and
Avanti Petroleum, Inc. v. St. Louis Co., 974 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
retail tobacco vendor's license fee was subject to voter approval requirement), with Ashworth
v. City of Moberly, 53 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that permit and inspection
fee needed to obtain a rental permit is not subject to voter approval requirement), and Mo.
Growth Ass'n v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 941 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
sewer charge not subject to voter approval requirement).
168. See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of Salinas, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Ct.
App. 2002) (subjecting storm drainage fee to voter approval); Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n
v. City of Roseville, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91 (Ct. App. 2002) (subjecting in-lieu franchise fee for
municipal water, sewer, and refuse collection services).
169. See Apartment Ass'n of L.A. County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 14 P.3d 930
(Cal. 2001) (finding apartment inspection fee imposed on private landowners to be outside
Proposition 218); Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of Riverside, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 592
(Ct. App. 1999) (finding assessments for street lighting not subject to Proposition 218);
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of San Diego, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 592 (Ct. App. 1999)
(holding business improvement district assessment not subject to Proposition 218).
2003]
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
3. Consequences of Limitation and Evasion
State judicial treatment of constitutional tax limitations defies easy
characterization. Certainly the tax limits seem to have had far more bite than
the public purpose requirements or the debt limits. Nevertheless, it appears
that much as the debt limitations stimulated the proliferation of new forms of
public borrowing that avoid the constitutional "debt" label, the tax
limitations have also spawned a host of revenue-raising devices that avoid
the constitutional "tax" label. As with debt, a significant share of state and
local revenue is now raised by devices not subject to tax limits. However,
unlike debt, most state and local revenue is still raised by constitutional
taxes.
As with debt, the shift to alternate methods of raising revenue has had
consequences other than circumventing tax limitations. With many local tax
limitations targeting specific categories of local government, such as cities
and counties, states and localities have an incentive to create special districts
and other new forms of local governments not expressly subject to
constitutional limitation.170 These entities may be given some revenue-
raising authority, yet so long as they cannot levy the property tax they may
be deemed to be exempt from constitutional restrictions. So, too, the
imposition of assessments or fees has often been accompanied by the
creation of a special purpose government - such as a municipal utility
district or a business improvement district - which collects and spends the
assessment or fee revenue. The creation of a separate, limited purpose
government providing a particular service to the payers will bolster the
argument that the charge in question is an assessment or fee and not a tax.
Thus, the tax limits can add to the complex nature of local governance and
may ultimately make local government less accountable to local residents -
probably not the outcome that proponents of tax limitation were seeking. 
17 1
170. See, e.g., L.A. Co. Transp. Comm. v. Richmond, 643 P.2d 941 (Cal. 1982); see
also KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL PURPOSE GOvERNMENT 17-18
(1997) (finding that older tax limitations were a "significant motivation for formation of
municipally coteiminous" special districts); John J. Kirlin, The Impact of Fiscal Limits on
Governance, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197, 206-08 (1998) (noting that local adaptations to
Proposition 13 have included the creation of new governmental entities that contribute to
governmental fragmentation and reduce the popular visibility of government). But cf Rider v.
County of San Diego, 820 P.2d 1000 (Cal. 1991) (holding agency created in order to
circumvent Proposition 13's limits was a "special district" within the meaning of Proposition
13).
171. There are two other consequences that flow from local government tax limits.
Local tax limits cause a shift in political power from local governments to the states. See
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The turn to non-tax revenue sources also tends to reduce the ability of
states and local governments to engage in redistributive programs. The key
to the exemption of fees, charges, and special assessments from the label of
"tax" is that they provide the payers with a benefit at least equal to their
payments (or to the social costs imposed by the payer's behavior). By
definition, this precludes the use of fees and assessments to finance broadly
redistributive activities. Assessments and fees enable those willing and able
to pay for higher levels of service for themselves to do so, but services for
the poor must be funded out of general, redistributive taxation, and those
taxes are more likely to be subject to constitutional restrictions. This,
however, may well be consistent with the goals of those who favor tax
limitation.
V. EXPLAINING THE DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION
Why have so many state courts given state fiscal limits, particularly the
public purpose requirements and the debt restrictions, a crabbed and
unsympathetic interpretation, tied to a narrow reading of the specific text
rather than a broader approach building on the constitutional spirit of
limitation and control? It is difficult to say. The judges in these cases rarely
explain their motives or even acknowledge that they are engaged in
narrowing interpretations. Still, several interrelated factors appear to play a
significant role.
First, courts tend to treat fiscal limits not as issues of fundamental rights
- like speech, religion, or privacy - or as matters fundamental to government
structure - like separation of powers, bicameralism, or federalism - but
rather as ordinary legislation. As the California Supreme Court observed in a
case narrowing the scope of Proposition 13's requirement that new local
"special taxes" receive the approval of two-thirds of local voters, "[w]e are
not here concerned with a measure that affects those fundamental rights of
individuals which might be endangered in the hands of a majority."' 172
Decisions concerning how the state will raise or spend money, whether to
Skidmore, supra uote 122, at 95-98; Alvin D. Sokolow, The Changing Property Tax and
State-Local Relations, 28 Puruus J. FED. 165 (1998). Moreover, local tax limits provide
incentives to local governments to promote and compete for commercial development. See
Jonathan Schwartz, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the
Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 183 (1997) (labeling
such incentives as the "fiscalization of municipal land use decisions").
172. Richmond, 643 P.2d at 945; see also City & County of San Francisco v. Farrell,
648 P.2d 935, 938 (Cal. 1982) (stating that "the two-thirds vote requirement in section 4 [of
Proposition 13] is inherently undemocratic").
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invest in projects that aid the private sector, to authorize an arcane
appropriation-clause debt deal, or to impose a "broad-based tax on
consumers" 173 to pay for local public services are seen as matters of policy
and politics, not matters of rights and law, and therefore, as "best resolved
by the people's elected representatives in the Legislature" 174 rather than by
the courts. 1
7 5
As the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed in a 1999 decision validating
a subject-to-appropriation debt arrangement, "[r]espect for the integrity of
the tripartite scheme for distribution of governmental powers commands that
the judiciary abstain from intrusion into legislative policymaking [because]
the legislature has the right and responsibility to declare Oklahoma's fiscal
policy... ."176 Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in a 1994 case
authorizing the use of a public authority as a conduit for the issuance of debt
for the state's transportation program, found that "there is a special
deference to the legislature in regard to matters of fiscal policy and
taxation."1 7
7
Indeed, the debt provisions are often treated as little more than technical
shoals to be navigated by clever lawyering rather than as embodiments of
substantively valuable principles. As the New Jersey Supreme Court
observed in New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane,178 "the
modem science of government has found a method of avoiding [the debt]
clause, and the courts have approved it. ' 179 Conduit financing through an
independent public authority is "the constitutionally acceptable device of
modem day progressive government" and may be used for "the expeditious
accomplishment of public purpose projects."'180 More recently, in affirming
the constitutionality of "subject-to-appropriation" debt, the court implicitly
praised the "sophisticated means now used to finance" 18 1 state and local
173. Richmond, 643 P.2d at 945.
174. CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054, 1061 (Wash. 1996).
175. Id. ("[P]ublic purpose is not a static concept. Rather, it is a concept that must
necessarily evolve and change to meet changing public attitudes .... The Legislature with its
staff and committees is the branch of government better suited to monitor and assess
contemporary attitudes than are the courts."); see also id. at 1068 ("Of the three branches of
government, the Legislature is best able to consider what measures promote the general
welfare.").
176. Fent v. Okla. Capitol Improvement Auth., 984 P.2d 200,204 (Okla. 1999).
177. Wilson v. Ky. Transp. Cabinet, 884 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Ky. 1994).
178. 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972).
179. Id. at 557.
180. Id. at 559.
181. Lonegan 11, 819 A.2d 395, 403 (N.J. 2003).
940 [Vol. 34:907
FOREWORD
activities. Noting the important role that debt avoidance has come to play in
state finance, the court stressed the "need to maintain stability in respect of
the variety of financial instruments authorized by the Legislature. ' 18
2
Contemporary judicial approaches to the public purpose and debt
limitation provisions may have been influenced by the United States
Supreme Court's post-New Deal jurisprudence treating economic and social
issues as political matters for legislative determination, rather than as
constitutional issues for the courts. But the Federal Constitution is largely
silent on fiscal questions, whereas state constitutions have a long history of
regulating state and local finance. By treating public finance as largely
political, with little role for the courts, state judges have caused state
constitutional law in this area to resemble federal constitutional law despite
the significant differences between the state and federal constitutional texts.
Second, the state courts often appear quite sympathetic to the goals of
the programs that would be curbed by the fiscal limits. State judges, most of
whom are elected, 183 appear to share with state governors and legislators a
belief in the legitimacy of the modern activist state and the many projects -
roads, dams, schools, power plants, convention centers, stadiums, and aid to
targeted industries and firms - that contemporary state and local
governments undertake. As the New Jersey Supreme Court asserted in a case
dealing with the financing of a sports complex in that state's Meadowlands
area, "under our democratic form of government public projects are not
confined to the barebones of political life." 184 This may be another aspect of
the acceptance of the expanded post-New Deal public sector, not only at the
federal level, but at the state and local levels as well. The political branches
have assumed a responsibility for promoting jobs and growth - it is, after all,
"the economy, stupid," that makes and unmakes governments - and the
courts appear to agree that politicians are right, or at least reasonable, in
doing so.185 Virtually all public spending programs can be defined as
182. Id. at 397.
183. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and
the Rule of Law, 62 U. Cmii. L. REv. 689, 725-26 (1995) (noting that in thirty-eight states,
most or all judges are elected).
184. McCrane, 292 A.2d at 552.
185. See Delogu v. State, 720 A.2d 1153, 1155 (Me. 1998) (noting that "employment
is one of the government's principal concerns... indirect economic benefits, such as job
creation and retention, may qualify as valid public purposes"); WDW Props., Inc. v. City of
Sumter, 535 S.E.2d 631, 635-36 (S.C. 2000) (finding that "economic welfare is one of the
main concerns of the city, state, and the federal government"); Libertarian Party of Wis. v.
State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 434 (Wis. 1996) (stating that economic development, tourism, and
reducing unemployment are "clearly public purposes").
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promoting economic growth, as in some Keynesian sense they all do.
Consequently, public purpose requirements impose little constraint on
government action.
By the same token, as the notion of public purpose has grown, the
definition of debt has narrowed. Some courts acknowledge that they treat
debt limitations as disfavored provisions, to be gotten around if at all
possible. As the Nevada Supreme Court recently observed, "the public
interest is likely promoted" if an agreement that could be treated as either
debt or not debt is held not to be debt. Modern financing arrangements, the
court noted, provide government agencies with the "flexibility" they
need. 18 6 Similarly, both the New Jersey and Wisconsin Supreme Courts, in
almost identical language, have made the point that "it is never an illegal
evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired
result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal way to
do it."' 187 In other words, lease-purchase financing, appropriation clause
financing, or moral obligation debt are not so much gimmicks challenging a
desirable constitutional norm of limited government as legitimate measures
enabling states and local governments to fund needed projects. In the
absence of an outright conflict between a financing instrument and the
constitutional text, "the debt clause of the Constitution must be
construed. . to the end that public progress and development will not be
stifled and that public problems with their ever increasing complexity may
be met and solved." 188 The New Jersey Supreme Court put it most candidly
when it proclaimed a position of "broad tolerance to permit public financing
devices of needed facilities not constituting on their face present, interest-
bearing obligations of the State itself."
189
State courts are at times critical of these evasions of the state
constitutional text. But their perception that these are matters of ordinary
politics, not constitutional principle, makes them reluctant to strike down a
creative financing scheme. As Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York
Court of Appeals observed: "Modern ingenuity, even gimmickry" may have
186. Employers Ins. Co. of Nev. v. State Bd. of Exam'rs, 21 P.3d 628, 633 (Nev.
2001).
187. See McCrane, 292 A.2d at 557 (quoting Clayton v. Kervick, 244 A.2d 281, 288
(N.J. 1968)); Dieck v. Unified Sch. Dist. of Antigo, 477 N.W.2d 613,619-20 (Wis. 1991); see
also In re Okla. Improvement Auth., 958 P.2d 759, 763 (Okla. 1998) (holding that "[i]t is not
unconstitutional to accomplish a desired result, lawful in itself, by innovative legal
measures").
188. McCrane, 292 A.2d at 559-60.
189. Bulman v. McCrane, 312 A.2d 857, 861 (N.J. 1973).
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"stretched the words of the (New York] Constitution beyond the point of
prudence ... ."190 But fiscal imprudence is not a matter for the courts.
According to Chief Judge Kaye, "that plea for reform in state borrowing
practices and policy is appropriately directed to the public arena."
19 1
Third - and this may help explain some of the difference in treatment
between the public purpose requirements and debt limits on the one hand
and the tax limits on the other - is the question of whether government
measures that evade these restrictions are seen as imposing any burdens or
creating any harms. In public purpose and debt cases, individual taxpayers
often do not appear before the court and are effectively invisible. Even when
they do appear, the connection between a particular spending or borrowing
program and any particular taxpayer is highly attenuated. As a result, in
public purpose cases, new types of governrnent programs do not seem to
have any negative effects on individuals at all, while the only individuals
affected by innovative schemes are those who buy government bonds. So
long as the financial instruments plainly disclaim the commitment of the
state's full faith and credit or any state obligation to pay, they give notice to
the bond buyer that they are not "debt," and the bond buyers' interests are
thereby protected. The potential impact on current or future taxpayers is
either not seen or not treated as significant.
By contrast, in cases involving tax limitations, plaintiffs are frequently
the individuals or firms subject to tax, or associations of taxpayers, who can
make a convincing claim that they are directly and negatively affected by the
asserted tax. Moreover, although courts have expanded the category of non-
tax revenue-raising devices, there will still be some payers who can argue
that a particular fee, charge or assessment is sufficiently redistributive or
coercive that it ought to be treated as a tax. It may, thus, be easier to see that
these measures are taxes in tension with constitutional constraints on
taxation and that these measures infringe the very interests that the
constitutional measures were intended to protect. Still, although courts have
trimmed tax limitations at the margins - at times reflecting an awareness that
tax limitations affect the ability of governments to fund their programs 192 -
the central provisions of such limitations have been enforced.
Finally, and this too may explain some of the difference in treatment
between public purpose and debt restrictions on the one hand and the tax and
expenditure limitations on the other, courts may be influenced by the degree
190. Schulz v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1140, 1150 (N.Y. 1994).
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 648 P.2d 935, 938 (Cal.
1982); Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003).
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to which the provisions reflect current political values and enjoy
contemporary political support. The public purpose and debt limits tend to
be quite old, typically dating back to the mid-nineteenth century, or, for the
younger states, to their admission to the Union. There is little evidence that
they enjoy much active current support. Broad trends in government lasting
more than a half-century have included both expansions of the scope of
public responsibilities and an increase in public-private partnerships. These
developments are at odds with the limited definition of public purpose and
the desire for the sharp separation of public and private that animated the
mid-nineteenth century public purpose requirements. Moreover, there has
been an enormous growth in government borrowing and debt-financed
public investment.
By contrast, many tax and expenditure limitations, including all the
more restrictive ones, were adopted relatively recently. Many are the
products of grass-roots activism and were enacted by voter initiative. There
are anti-tax and taxpayer rights organizations committed to their defense. In
at least one instance - California's Proposition 218 - voters responded to a
state supreme court's narrow reading of constitutional tax restrictions by
enacting a new measure intended to undo some of the court's actions.193
Where public purpose requirements and debt limitations appear to be
unsupported by, if not at odds with, contemporary politics, tax and
expenditure limitations continue to embody the active political current that
brought them to life.
VI. OF DEBT AND TAXES: THE PLACE FOR FISCAL LIMITS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
What does the history of state fiscal limits, and the current relatively
disfavored status of the public purpose requirement and debt limits, tell us
about the project of constitutionalizing constraints on state and local
finance? Are these desirable provisions which have suffered from mistaken
judicial decisions? Or do the court decisions suggest deeper problems with
constitutionalizing fiscal limits?
Two initial considerations ought to shape the general question of
whether public finance restrictions ought to be in state constitutions. First,
does a matter need to be constitutionalized, that is, placed beyond the day-to-
day control of the political process and instead entrenched in the
193. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(c); Stark, supra note 112, at 200-03 (describing
Proposition 218 and another ballot initiative, Proposition 62, as responses to California
Supreme Court decisions narrowing Proposition 13).
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fundamental structure of the states? Second, even if in theory a rule or
principle ought to constrain ordinary politics and be protected from politics
rather than subject to politics, is constitutionalization an effective means of
obtaining that goal?
A. Public Purpose
The first consideration suggests that there is something to be said for a
public purpose requirement. The fundamental purpose of government,
justifying the coercive taxation that enables government to pursue its
spending and lending programs, is the promotion of the public good. Public
purpose is essential to all government action. Moreover, it would be
desirable to adopt a constitutional rule limiting the ability of the states and
local governments to dedicate public funds to private ends. State and local
spending presents the classic problem of concentrated benefits of the
politically influential few at the expense of the broad polity of taxpayers.
Special interest groups have the incentive to lobby and the means to reward
legislators who provide them with benefits. But the general public is
unlikely to be sharply affected by any one interest group giveaway and lacks
both the incentive and the means to closely police spending programs. Thus,
there is a case for a public purpose limit on government spending.
Yet, for reasons suggested by the second general consideration, the
public purpose requirement as a constraint on legislative action is a dead
letter today. 1
94
While it may be generally agreed that all government spending should
promote a public purpose, there is no generally agreed-upon standard for
defining the public purpose. The courts have essentially concluded that the
meaning of public purpose is to be politically, not judicially, determined, so
that the public purpose is defined by the results of the pulling and hauling,
194. Two specific constitutional limitations on aid to the private sector - the bans on
the lending of credit, and the limits on public subscriptions of private stock - have fared
better. The ban on the lending of credit makes sense. Lending credit in the sense of suretyship
generates the fiscal illusion that it is cost-free. Government officiais may persuade themselves
that the contingent liability will never come due. Given that there is no initial out-of-pocket
cost, voters may have little incentive to police these arrangements either. For that very reason,
constitutional restriction is appropriate. On the other hand, the stock subscription ban seems
to make little sense. Today, the principal effect of the ban is to preclude the government from
taking an equity interest in the firms it is assisting, thus eliminating the possibility that the
public might gain directly from its investment. See, e.g., Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson,
723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986). It is difficult to see why it is permissible for the government to
give public money away but not to get some of it back.
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the conflicts and compromises, and the deliberations and maneuvers that
mark the political process. 195 More specifically, state judges have largely
deferred to the decisions of governors and legislatures throughout the
country that economic development, jobs, and expansion of the tax base are
public purposes justifying the gift or loan of public funds. Given the broad
public assumption of governmental responsibility for the economy, and
given the dependence of state and local governments on the well-being of
state and local economies and on the sufficiency of their particular tax bases,
the emergence of economic development as the ultimate public purpose is
not surprising. It is certainly difficult to see courts - particularly state courts
composed of elected state judges - challenging the legislature's declaration
of the public importance of economic growth, more jobs, and expanding the
tax base.
Even with judicial deference to the legislative definition of economic
development as public purpose, courts could in theory play a role in
determining whether a particular economic development program actually
advances its stated public purpose. With many economic development
programs little more than giveaways of tax breaks or low-interest loans to
private firms, courts could more strictly scrutinize the fit between the public
end and the means chosen, or the balance between the public and private
benefits, particularly for measures that provide significant private gains but
only speculative public ones. But this would involve difficult empirical
questions of assessing the benefits from a program and calculating how
likely they are to occur. In many cases a more difficult question would be
deciding whether to classify a particular benefit as public or private, or what
is the proper balance between public and private benefits. Given that the
theory of economic-development-as-public-purpose assumes a public
interest in individuals getting jobs or in persuading a business to remain in a
jurisdiction, then most benefits of these programs are simultaneously public
and private. Requiring a court to disentangle the two may be an impossible
job. Moreover, even if the public and private elements can be distinguished,
determining how much public benefit is enough to justify a program that
also provides significant private benefits is just as problematic. The state
courts may well be wise in concluding that such review is beyond their
capacity, and that the means for pursuing economic development as Well as
195. State judicial treatment of public purpose is, thus, similar to the federal and state
judicial treatment of "public use" in eminent domain cases. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
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the determination that economic development is a legitimate public end is a
political question, not a judicial one.
This is not to deny that many contemporary economic development
strategies present serious questions about the diversion of public resources
to private ends. Most studies indicate that government financial assistance
and tax breaks are relatively minor factors in corporate location
decisions. 196 Moreover, corporations have proven adept at playing
competing localities against each other in order to extract government
payments or tax exemptions. 197 Even when companies do create new jobs in
response to a government incentive, the payments may be short-term and the
firm may pull up stakes a few years later. 198 In these situations, the public
benefits are dubious at best and the opportunities for special interest abuse
are clear. Yet, given the difficulties of judicial policing of constitutional
limits on economic development programs, a better strategy for protecting
the public fisc from economic development programs that unduly benefit
private firms might be statutory reforms that provide for better record
keeping and public disclosure of the benefits that economic development
programs produce, as well as closer legislative and media scrutiny of the
asserted benefits of these programs. 199  Contemporary economic
development programs raise political issues that require political solutions,
not judicial resuscitation of the public purpose doctrine.
B. Debt Limitations
There is also a plausible case for the constitutionalization of debt
limitations. Debt promises gains in terms of new facilities or programs that
196. See PETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTRPENEuRiAL STATE: STATE AND
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEvELOPMENT PoucY IN THE UNTrED STATES 200-24 (1988); Rachel Weber,
Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don't Create Jobs: The Role of Corporate
Governance, 32 URB. LAw. 97 (2000).
197. See, e.g., Bryan D. Jones & Lynn W. Bachelor, Local Policy Discretion and the
Corporate Surplus, in URBAN ECONOMIC DEvELOPMENT 223-44 (Richard D. Bingham & John
P. Blair eds., 1984)
198. See Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (finding a company's receipt of a long-term tax abatement for a new
plant does not estop the company from closing the plant during the abatement period); City of
Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Corp., 649 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing breach of
contract and equitable estoppel claims against company that accepted economic development
benefits and subsequently closed its plant).
199. See, e.g., Michael LaFave, Taking Back the Giveaways: Minnesota's Corporate
Welfare Legislation and the Search for Accountability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1579 (1996).
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come on line immediately, with the associated costs deferred into the future.
With easy access to debt, current elected officials may be tempted to
approve projects that are not cost-justified. They can get the credit for the
new project,200 but the blame for the additional taxes needed to pay off the
debt will be borne by their successors. With future debts unlikely to become
a present campaign issue, ordinary politics may fail to provide effective
checks on the decision to incur debt. Thus, constitutional debt limitations
may be justified by the lack of effective political controls over the borrowing
decision.
Yet, like public purpose requirements, debt limitations are increasingly
ineffective, and courts are complicit in the widespread evasion of
constitutional restrictions. 201 Like legislators and governors, state judges
seem quite sympathetic to the programmatic spending goals that the debt
limits would thwart. In the era of the modern activist state, state judges, like
other state elected officials, appear to believe that debt limits are more likely
to get in the way of good government than to promote it.
One reason for this lack of judicial sympathy for debt limitation may be
the archaic nature of many of the constitutional debt provisions. Many state
constitutions either prohibit long-term debt outright, or impose laughably
low dollar limits that date back to the nineteenth century. Such provisions,
inspire, if they do not justify, evasion. Debt limitations might be more
defensible, and might receive more effective judicial enforcement, if they
were increased to levels consistent with current capital needs and with the
revenue-raising capacities of contemporary state and local governments.
Hawai'i's relatively modern debt limit, which caps state debt service to
18.5% of the average of state general fund revenues over the preceding three
fiscal years, suggests one possible formulation.
202
200. That credit may involve not simply the appreciation of the voters for new
facilities and services, but also the special gratitude of campaign donors and interest groups
with a specific stake in building and financing facilities, such as construction contractors,
construction workers and municipal finance lenders and lawyers.
201. But see Sterk & Goldman, supra note 13, at 1365. Sterk and Goldman contend
that public purpose and debt limitations have in fact been effective, arguing that although
courts have liberalized the constitutional restrictions the courts still use the limitations to
police public borrowing decisions. Id. Part of the difference between their evaluation and
mine may be a matter of timing. They published their article more than a dozen years ago,
when some state courts continued to enforce public purpose requirements and before the
subject-to-appropriation device had received widespread state judicial ratification.
202. HAw. CONST. art. VII, § 13; see also WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (limiting debt
service on state debt to 9% of average of state revenues over three prior fiscal years).
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But a carrying capacity approach also opens new issues. One difficulty
is determining the appropriate base for calculating carrying capacity. As
previously noted, many limits on local debt actually take a carrying capacity
approach by making permissible debt levels a fraction of local assessed
valuation. Yet today many localities rely significantly on sources of revenue
other than the property tax so that property valuation may well understate
local resources for debt service. Even if the denominator for calculating
carrying capacity were modernized to take into account the role of sales and
income taxes and other contemporary revenue sources, the numerator would
still be problematic. Constitutional debt limits have been set at widely
varying levels. As two municipal finance experts have noted, the enormous
difference in state and local debt limits "belies the notion that there is some
consensus about the optimal level of debt."'20 3 Thus, although the carrying
capacity concept is appealing in principle it may be difficult to implement in
practice. In any event, there has been little effort generally to modernize
limits along these lines, as evasion has provided legislators with an
acceptable and more readily available alternative to constitutional reform.
Moreover, it could be argued that the real issue with state and local debt
is not the adequacy of taxable resources to pay debt service, but the
adequacy of state and local debt to meet future capital needs. Debt can play
a crucial role in providing the physical infrastructure vital to the future
economic and social health of a community, particularly schools, hospitals,
roads, and mass transit facilities. Low levels of debt and the resulting low
levels of capital investment can be as harmful to a state or locality as
excessive debt. A constitutional debt limitation ought to take into account
future capital needs as well as ability to pay. But there is no obvious metric
for assessing future needs or for incorporating a concern about capital needs
into the constitutional standard. As a result, constitutional debt limitations
are likely to fail to address the question of future capital needs or to balance
the competing concerns of future capital investment and future taxpayer
liability.
Thus, much like the public purpose requirement, a constitutional debt
limit seems attractive in theory but it has proven extremely difficult to
operationalize in practice. 204
203. AMDuRsKY & GaiLTr supra note 20, at 171.
204. Professor Clayton Gillette has suggested that if the principal concern about debt
is the ability of state taxpayers to repay their obligation, then creditors may be very good
representatives of the taxpayers' interest. Clayton P. Gillette, Municipal Creditors as
Municipal Monitors (Sept. 6, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Creditors
have the incentive to monitor the finances of state and local borrowers, and their interests in
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C. Tax and Expenditure Limitations
Unlike public purpose requirements and debt limitations, there is not
even much of a theoretical case to be made for constitutional tax and
expenditure limitations. Whereas debt has binding long-term consequences,
and the decision whether or not to incur debt may receive inadequate public
scrutiny, tax rates may be easily changed, and taxation is typically an
extremely salient political issue. New taxes and tax increases trigger an
immediate burden on current voters, and anti-tax forces are well-represented
in the political process. Politicians who enact high taxes may be punished by
the voters in the next election, and few politicians are likely to doubt the
political significance of anti-tax sentiment. It is not clear why further
constitutional protection needs to be superimposed on the protections
provided by the ability of the voters to vote out of office elected officials
who raise taxes.
State constitutional limitations on local taxation seem particularly
inappropriate. Local government actions may be more transparent than state
decisions, and many local governments are subject to effective monitoring,
participation, and political control by grassroots taxpayers. Local taxation is
further constrained by the vigorous inter-local competition for mobile
taxpayers. 205 Given the existence of both significant exit and significant
voice opportunities at the local level it is unclear what constitutional need
state tax limits on localities serve. Rather, substantive constitutional limits
on local taxation interfere with local autonomy since they preclude localities
whose people are willing to support tax increases from taking such action.
Holding all local governments in a state to the same limit fails to recognize
the inter-local variations in needs, circumstances, and preferences that
animate home rule.20
6
state and municipal solvency to some degree overlap those of state and local taxpayers. Id.
Gillette suggests that certain subconstitutional changes in municipal finance law could
improve the capacity of creditors to stand as surrogates for taxpayer interests. Id.
205. For the classic authority on the significance of inter-local mobility for local
decision-making, see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL-
EcoN. 416 (1956).
206. City & County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 648 P.2d 935, 938 (Cal. 1982) (noting
that Proposition 13 "was imposed by a simple majority of the voters throughout the state upon
a local entity to prohibit a majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters of that entity from
taxing themselves for programs or services which would benefit largely local residents").
Indeed, local tax limits appear to have made local governments more fiscally dependent on
their states and to have resulted in a loss in local power. See Slddmore, supra note 122, at 95-
96; Sokolow, supra note 171, at 178-86.
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Moreover, because the property tax has long been a central focus of the
tax limitations movement, tax limitations often bind local governments far
more tightly than they bind the states. Although localities have proved
inventive in expanding the range of non-tax taxes, the property tax is still
central to local finances and in many states property tax limits have really
constrained local revenues. As a result, localities have become more
dependent on state aid, and states generally account for a greater share of the
total of state and local spending. It is unlikely that tax limit proponents
desired such a centralization of power from localities to the states but that
has often been the result.
Of course, states as well as local governments have also been targeted by
the most recent tax limitation efforts, with a number of state constitutions
now requiring either voter approval or legislative supermajorities to increase
tax rates or impose new taxes. Not much is known empirically about the
effect of these requirements, but one study of California - which requires a
two-thirds vote in each legislative house to pass a new tax or tax increase -
found that "gridlock and irresponsibility can be observed much more
frequently ... than mature compromise." 207 Certainly the two-thirds rule
contributed to California's fiscal and political problems in 2003.
The consequences for Governor Gray Davis are by now internationally
known, but a less heralded, although comparably interesting, development
illustrating the effects of a recently adopted constitutional provision
requiring a supermajority for tax increases played itself out in neighboring
Nevada in the summer of 2003. There, due to a two-thirds requirement for
tax increases, the Nevada legislature failed to reach agreement on the budget
for public education during its regular session, then failed again in two extra
sessions. In the second session, the necessary tax increases passed the upper
house but failed twice in the lower house, by votes of 27 to 15, or one vote
shy of the constitutionally mandated supermajority. The governor then
petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
legislature to pass a budget. Faced with this constitutionally provoked
impasse and noting the state's constitutional obligation to provide for the
"support and maintenance" of the public schools, the court took the
extraordinary step of suspending the two-thirds requirement and then
directed the legislature to consider the education budget under a simple
207. Matthew D. McCubbins, Putting the State Back into State Government: The
Constitution and the Budget, in CoNsTrrtroNAL REFORm iN CALtRRNIA: MAKING STATE




majority rule.208 Like many of the state courts in the debt limit cases, the
Nevada Supreme Court simply concluded that the two-thirds rule - a mere
"procedural requirement" - was less important than the "basic, substantive
right" to an adequately funded education.209
Yet, despite the theoretical difficulties with tax and expenditure
limitations, they have done much better in the state courts than the
theoretically more defensible public purpose and debt provisions - this
summer's extraordinary Nevada decision to the contrary notwithstanding.
This may be due to their recent nature and continuing popular support. It is
no surprise that a constitutional provision that reflects strongly held current
political values is more likely to be effectively enforced than measures that
are seen as archaic and arcane. So, too, the success of these limits may be
due to the fact that, unlike the public purpose requirements, their meaning is
relatively clear; and, unlike the debt limitations, state and local legislators
have not come up with revenue-raising devices that do the work of broad-
based taxes as successfully as contemporary revenue bonds have substituted
for general obligation debt.
D. Voter Approval Requirements
Many state fiscal limits take the form of voter approval requirements.
Voter approval has long been an important component of debt limitations.
So, too, as Professor Kirk Stark has recently written, voter approval
requirements are an important theme in contemporary tax and expenditure
limitations, particularly at the local level. 210 Voter approval is certainly a
more flexible means of controlling taxes than a specific limit carved into the
constitution. Moreover, for local governments, a requirement that the local
electorate approve new taxes or debts is more consistent with home rule than
a statewide provision capping local taxes or debt. Professor Stark has also
argued that by bringing voters into the process of raising taxes these limits
can promote democracy by assuring that new taxes have obtained the
consent of those affected,211 and by enabling the voters to participate
directly in an important question of governance. 2 12
208. Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003). The legislature did
ultimately pass the necessary revenue-raising legislation by a two-thirds majority. See Guinn
v. Legislature of Nev., 76 P.3d 22, 25 (Nev. 2003).
209. 71 P.3d at 1275.
210. See Stark, supra note 112, at 207.
211. Id. at 207-16.
212. Id. at 236-50.
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Whether conditioning new taxes or new debts on voter approval is
desirable is inevitably linked to the more general debate over direct
democracy. 2 13 To be sure, most of the discussion of direct democracy has
concerned the voter initiative - that is, the ability of individuals and interest
groups to sidestep the legislature and bring constitutional amendments and
legislative proposals directly to the electorate for enactment - whereas voter
approval requirements for new taxes or debts involve referenda following
legislative action, with voter approval an additional requirement, not a
substitute for legislative approval. As a result, one important argument for
direct democracy, that it enables voters to act on popular measures bottled
up in the legislature by political gridlock or hostile interest groups,2 14 is
inapplicable since voter approval requirements apply only to measures that
have already emerged from the legislature. On the other hand, some of the
concerns about the voter initiative - that it can enable majority groups to
ride roughshod over minorities or that the lack of legislative deliberation can
lead to the adoption of ill-considered and poorly drafted laws2 15 - is equally
inapposite since protection for minority rights and opportunities for
deliberation are still provided by the legislature. Still many of the concerns
raised about direct democracy, including whether the voters are competent
enough and sufficiently informed to address complex questions of public
policy 216 and whether the fraction of voters that actually votes on ballot
propositions is actually representative of the full electorate, 2 17 continue to
apply to voter approval requirements for new taxes or debts.
Professor Stark argues that the possibility that voter approval
requirements will "stimulate greater public deliberation regarding... tax
213. For criticisms of direct democracy, see generally DAVID MAGLEBY, DIREcT
LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984); Sherman
Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARv. L. REv. 434 (1998); Philip
Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and
the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WIU.AMETrE L. REv. 421 (1998). For more
sympathetic treatments, see DAviD SCHMIDT, CIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE
REVOLUTION (1989); Clayton Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34
WnLLAMETrE L. REv. 609 (1998). For a particularly negative account of the effect of direct
democracy concerning fiscal matters in California, see PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST:
CAiwoRNIA's EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE (1998).
214. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1348
(1985).
215. Id. at 1360-64.
216. See THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITCS OF INrlATIvE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 60-90 (1989); MAGLEBY, supra note 213, at 122-44.
217. MAGLEBY, supra note 213, at 77-99.
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burdens" 2 18 is an important benefit of the new tax limitation amendments.
As he notes, "[ilt is hard to imagine a public policy issue more suitable for
community deliberation, especially at the local level."'219 Yet, the very high
level of voter interest in questions of taxation calls into question the need for
voter approval requirements to spark public dialogue. Taxes are typically a
major issue even when only elected officials and not the tax increases
themselves are on the ballot. Moreover, whatever public dialogue results
from a voter approval requirement is likely to be impoverished if the only
question the voters are asked is whether to approve a new tax or a tax
increase, not which services to cut if the tax is not approved, which of two or
more different taxes with different impacts on different payers to approve, or
how to combine a range of tax and service packages. 220
Voter approval requirements take us beyond the eighteenth century
concern with "no taxation without representation" to a twenty-first century
doctrine of "no taxation, even with representation, without direct voter
consent." It is not clear that this is necessary to correct political process
failures or to promote deliberation concerning levels of taxation given the
intense public concern with these questions already. Indeed, whatever
benefits they may have in promoting civic engagement or assuring that tax
increases reflect the "consent of the governed," voter approval requirements,
like the substantive tax and expenditure limitations, appear to be driven
primarily by the desire to make it more difficult to enact or increase taxes
than to adopt nearly all other forms of legislation. Thus, the case for
including such a voter approval requirement in a state constitution must
ultimately rest on hostility to taxation. Surely, only such an anti-tax
principle, rather than a commitment to democracy or popular deliberation,
can explain such provisions as Proposition 13's mandate of a local
supermajority popular vote for new local taxes. Such a rule does not
empower local majorities; it thwarts them. However, even rules requiring
local simple majorities for tax increases seem as much concerned with
erecting new hurdles to taxation as assuring that tax decisions reflect the
local popular will. Thus, whether new or increased taxes ought to be
contingent on voter, approval ultimately turns on whether substantive
218. Stark, supra note 122, at 237.
219. Id. at 240.
220. Professor Stark acknowledges this when he observes that "simply requiring voter
approval for new or increased taxes is unlikely to ignite substantive democratic dialogue
regarding the allocation of tax burdens." Id. at 241; see also Clark, supra note 213 (criticizing
direct democracy for limiting voters to simple yes-or-no choices and not enabling them to
express their priorities over a range of issues).
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hostility to taxation ought to be a constitutional norm, not on the need to
reform the state and local political processes for addressing tax questions.
Voter approval requirements for bond issues present a slightly different
question. New debt, with its binding long-term nature, bears some
resemblance to a constitutional amendment. Both commit future generations
to a long-term course of action. Indeed, a new bond issue may be more
binding than a new state constitutional provision since a constitution may be
amended and a new provision repealed while debt creates debt service
commitments protected by the Federal Contracts Clause from subsequent
state impairment.22 1 Moreover, in the absence of a referendum vote,
questions about the level of state and local debt and the worthiness of debt-
funded projects are less likely to be the subject of public debate than
questions about taxation, even though debt levels ultimately affect taxes.
Thus, there may be something to be said for a constitutional requirement that
makes debt harder to incur, even as many questions about voter information,
voter competence, and the representative nature of the electorate in bond-
issue elections make it unclear whether voter approval is the right test for
determining the appropriateness of new debt.
222
VII. CONCLUSION: FISCAL LIMITS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Finally, what does the uncertain fate of state constitutional fiscal limits
tell us about the project of state constitutional law generally? Certainly, it
would be wrong to overstate the meaning or to predicate the analysis of state
constitutional law on a specific and relatively discrete set of issues. The state
judicial treatment of state fiscal limits may have only limited relevance to
the interpretation of the civil liberties or positive rights guarantees of state
constitutions. Yet, several implications emerge which may be a little
unsettling to the vision of state constitutions as an independent, and
progressive, alternative to a conservative Federal Constitution.
First, state constitutions are by no means simply "progressive," if
progressive is used to mean more supportive of activist, redistributive
government. Even as they impose affirmative duties on their governments,
state constitutions are also strongly marked by limited-government,
taxpayer-protective principles that are entirely absent from the Federal
221. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977).
222. See, e.g., Gillette, Direct Democracy, supra note 94, at 21-28 (discussing the low
turnout in bond issue elections, the unrepresentativeness of bond issue voters of the broader
electorate, and the concern that voters' aversion to change will lead to inadequate support for
financing necessary public facilities).
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Constitution. The rise of tax and expenditure limitations over the past three
decades has underscored this facet of state constitutional law. Although in a
rare case like the recent Nevada decision nullifying the requirement that tax
increases requires legislative supermajority approval, 223 positive rights can
prevail over taxpayer protection, state fiscal limits, particularly tax limits,
generally if subtly constrain government activism at the state and local
level. 22
4
Second, turning from constitutional texts to constitutional doctrine, state
constitutional law often operates in the shadow of the Federal Constitution.
Even where state courts deal with state constitutional provisions that have no
federal analogues, and where the United States Supreme Court cannot
review their judgments, state courts may still be deeply influenced by federal
constitutional jurisprudence. The state courts' many references to state fiscal
limits as matters of state economic policy, and the repeated calls for
deference to the legislature on fiscal questions, indicate that state courts
accept the Supreme Court's Carolene Products settlement - the
determination that economic and social matters that do not affect
fundamental rights or involve discrimination against discrete and insular
minorities are for the legislatures and not the courts.225 This appears to be
the case even though state constitutions give extensive consideration to these
matters while the federal document is largely silent about them.
Finally, state constitutional law is closely intertwined with state politics.
The fiscal limits with the strongest contemporary political support do best;
those limits that lack current political backing are virtually unenforced. The
Nevada case might seem less extraordinary once we notice that the Nevada
Supreme Court was not acting on its own but responding to a petition from
the governor and that the court's decision effectively empowered the state
legislature's majority over the objection of a recalcitrant minority.226 That
politics matters should not be news to students of state constitutional law.
223. See Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003).
224. See SCHRAG, supra note 213, at 154-57.
225. U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); accord Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 376 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("courts do not substitute their economic and social beliefs
for the judgment of the legislative bodies").
226. The legislature had previously rejected a proposal to amend the state constitution
to add the two-thirds rule; the rule was imposed by voter initiative over legislative opposition.
As the court dryly noted in apparently giving weight to the legislature's action, "[t]he voters
were not privy to the Assembly's concerns that culminated in the requirement's legislative
rejection." Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 76 P.3d 22, 30 (Nev. 2003).
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The combination of greater ease in amending state constitutions;227 the
existence of the voter initiative in half the states; extensive state
constitutional textual attention to the nitty-gritty of government operations;
and a judiciary that is either elected228 or appointed for limited, renewable
terms rather than for life all make some significant interplay between state
politics and state constitutional law inevitable.229 Still, the example of the
fiscal limits challenges and unsettles the notion of a state constitution as
something fundamental, separate from, and constraining ordinary state
politics. The fiscal limits suggest that at least for some features of state
constitutions - those with direct bearing on the operations of state and local
government - the constitution is constrained by politics rather than the other
way around.
I suppose none of these lessons is surprising. Constitutional law is not
autonomous. It is shaped by broader jurisprudential currents, the political
beliefs of the judges and justices, and the politics of the surrounding society.
Nor is it irrelevant. State fiscal limits have contributed to the proliferation of
new forms of borrowing and revenue-raising, held down the property tax,
weakened local governments, and promoted the growth of public authorities
and special purpose local units. However, the example of the fiscal limits
and their disfavored treatment by many state courts may be helpful in
reminding us of the need for modesty in considering the potential for the
emergence of state constitutional law as a source of alternative constitutional
norms in the American federal system.
227. The United States has operated under the same constitution since 1787, and that
document has been amended twenty-seven times. See CouNcEc OF STATE GovERNMENTs, THE
BOOK OF TmE STATES 2000-01, at 3 (2000). By contrast, the fifty states have had 146
constitutions, or nearly three per state. Id. Eighteen states have had four or more constitutions.
Id. Only nineteen of the states have operated under just one constitution. Id. Moreover, these
constitutions are frequently amended. At the start of 2000, the current constitutions of the
states had been amended over 6500 times. Id. Alabama led the way with 664 amendments,
and California and South Carolina trailed closely behind with 500 and 480 amendments
respectively. Id. Even the newest state constitution, the Georgia Constitution of 1982, has
been amended fifty-one times as of the start of 2000. Id.
228. See Croley, supra note 183, at 725-26 (doting that in thirty-eight states, most or
all judges are elected).
229. Helen Hershkoff has suggested that some of these factors, particularly voter
initiative, the ease of state constitutional amendment and the elective state judiciary, eliminate
some of the separation-of-powers and political legitimacy objections to more aggressive
judicial review at the state level and to state judicial enforcement of the positive rights
provisions of state constitutions. See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 6, at 1157-63;
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues:" Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HAR. L. REv. 1833, 1886-87 (2001).
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